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MORTGAGE MODIFICATION, EQUITABLE 





Mortgage foreclosures are at an all-time high and property values in 
many parts of the country have declined precipitously.  Yet bankruptcy, 
which is often a last resort for individuals in financial distress, provides 
little relief to a homeowner who finds that her mortgage debt exceeds the 
value of her home.  The reason for bankruptcy’s inadequacy in this regard 
is the Bankruptcy Code’s prohibition on the modification of home 
mortgages, a prohibition that became part of bankruptcy law in 1978 when 
most home mortgage loans were thirty-year fixed rate loans made by 
savings and loan associations.  While most secured loans can be stripped 
down in bankruptcy, reflecting the payment that the lender would receive if 
it were forced to foreclose on the collateral, a home mortgage loan must be 
paid in full, giving the lender more than it would receive under state law. 
 In recent years, abusive mortgage practices have proliferated.  These 
abusive practices, which have prevented homeowners from building equity 
in their homes, harm not only the debtor but also the debtor’s other 
creditors.  Despite their behavior, however, home mortgage lenders who 
engage in these practices continue to receive favorable treatment in 
bankruptcy.  In this Article, I argue that creditors should be denied special 
treatment in bankruptcy unless they behave in an “honest but unfortunate” 
manner.  Judges can deny this special treatment by using a time-honored 
bankruptcy principle, the principle of equitable subordination, to 
subordinate the unsecured portion of a home mortgage loan to all secured 
and priority claims.  While equitable subordination, by itself, will not solve 
the foreclosure crisis, it may, by reducing the claims of abusive mortgagees, 
deter abusive lending practices in the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy, with its underlying policy of relief for the honest but 
unfortunate debtor, is an important mechanism for relieving financial 
distress.  In the current mortgage crisis, however, bankruptcy is an 
inadequate tool because of the special treatment of home mortgage creditors 
under the Bankruptcy Code (Code).  Chapter 13 of the Code prohibits the 
modification of claims secured only by a security interest in the debtor’s 
principal residence.1
Most creditors are guaranteed only their state law property rights in 
bankruptcy, but home mortgage creditors can receive far more—they are 
entitled to full payment of their claims according to the original terms of the 
mortgage loan.
  The effect of this prohibition is particularly severe on 
homeowners who owe more on their mortgage loans than their homes are 
worth.  Many of these “underwater” mortgages are products of the abusive 
lending practices that have proliferated in the past decade, but regardless of 
the mortgage lender’s behavior, the lender is entitled to favorable treatment 
in Chapter 13. 
2
 
 1. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).  This prohibition is discussed in Part II.A, infra. 
  Therefore, a debtor who owes $350,000 on a house worth 
only $250,000 must pay the entire $350,000 after filing for bankruptcy.  
This favorable treatment is unique to home mortgagees; other secured 
creditors are guaranteed full payment of only the value of their collateral, 
and if their collateral is worth less than they are owed, they are treated as 
unsecured creditors for the amount by which the outstanding loan exceeds 
 2. Id. 
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the value of the collateral.3  This bifurcation of an undersecured creditor’s 
claim reflects that creditor’s foreclosure distribution because a foreclosing 
secured creditor receives the value of its collateral at the foreclosure sale 
and must pursue the debtor personally for the often uncollectible 
deficiency.4
Today, a staggering number of homeowners are struggling to pay 
mortgage obligations that exceed the value of their homes.  At the end of 
the third quarter of 2010, 22.5% of all residential properties with mortgages 
were encumbered by mortgages that exceeded the property’s value.
 
5  
Although declining home prices in many parts of the country contributed to 
this situation, the abusive lending practices that proliferated in the years 
preceding the recent foreclosure crisis exacerbated the problem.  Thirty 
years ago, most home loans were amortized over thirty years with a fixed 
rate of interest.  Lenders required full documentation of the borrower’s 
income, and monthly payments bore a reasonable relationship to the 
borrower’s income.  Immediately before the recent mortgage meltdown, 
many mortgage loans were non-amortizing (meaning that the monthly 
payments included no payments towards the principal amount of the loan), 
large in relation to both the borrower’s income and the value of the home, 
and were made with little or no documentation of the borrower’s financial 
status.6
Home mortgage creditors are entitled to full payment regardless of their 
behavior in the initiation of the loan because the Code has no explicit policy 
of providing relief only to the honest but unfortunate creditor.  The recent 
mortgage crisis has led to calls to allow debtors to modify their home 
mortgages in Chapter 13.  Several bills to ameliorate the effects of the anti-
modification provision have been introduced in Congress—all failed to 
pass.
  Rather than helping homeowners build wealth by building equity in 
their homes, these lending practices diminished homeowner wealth. 
7
 
 3. Id. §§ 506(b), 1325(a)(5).  Some automobile lenders are also entitled to full payment 
of their claims regardless of the value of their collateral, but those lenders are not entitled to 
their original loan terms. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(*) (the “hanging paragraph” at the end of 
§ 1325(a)). 
  There was also a robust debate in the press about mortgage 
modification, with some arguing that modification would result in a 
 4. In some states, anti-deficiency laws would prevent the mortgage lender from 
collecting the deficiency regardless of the borrower’s financial condition. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-814 (2007) (prohibiting deficiency judgments on loans secured by a 
single-family or two family residence on 2.5 acres or less); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b 
(West 1976 & Supp. 2010) (prohibiting deficiency judgments on purchase-money mortgage 
loans secured by a one to four family residence). 
 5. Press Release, CoreLogic, New CoreLogic Data Shows Third Consecutive Quarterly 
Decline in Negative Equity (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.corelogic.com
/uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/Q3_2010_Negative_Equity_FINAL.pdf.  
The CoreLogic report notes that the decline in negative equity was due primarily to 
foreclosures of underwater mortgages rather than rising home prices. Id.  The states with the 
highest percentage of negative equity mortgages during that period were Nevada (67%), 
Arizona (49%), and Florida (46%). Id. 
 6. I explain the changes in lending practices in Part II.B, infra. 
 7. See infra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
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windfall for homeowners and great losses for lenders.8  The Obama 
Administration, through the Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP),9 tried to encourage mortgage holders to modify mortgages 
outside of bankruptcy, but that program has been a dismal failure, with only 
a fraction of eligible homeowners receiving permanent modifications,10 and 
a high rate of re-default among those receiving permanent modifications.11  
There is little doubt that the number of mortgage foreclosures will remain at 
historically unprecedented levels12 and that a bankruptcy filing will not help 
many debtors remain in their homes unless home mortgages can be 
modified.13
The Code may already allow judges to modify some home mortgages, 
however.  In this Article I encourage judges to use existing Code provisions 
to modify home mortgages in cases in which the mortgage lender engaged 
in abusive lending practices.  My thesis is that in order for a creditor to take 
 
 
 8. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Judges Fix Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
2009, at A27 (arguing that permitting mortgage modification will swamp the bankruptcy 
courts); Todd J. Zywicki, Op-Ed., Don’t Let Judges Tear up Mortgage Contracts, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 13, 2009, at A13 (arguing that mortgage modification will result in a windfall to 
borrowers and an increase in bankruptcy filings). But see David M. Abromowitz, Cram 
Down Crunch Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 4, 2009, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-m-abromowitz/cram-down-crunch-
time_b_171721.html (noting that “[f]ew Americans realize that single family homeowners 
living in their own primary residence are the only real estate owners without cram down 
protections in bankruptcy”). 
 9. See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, http://makinghomeaffordable.gov/ (Feb. 14, 2011). 
 10. In his October 2010 Quarterly Report to Congress, Neil Barofsky, the Special 
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), reported that “HAMP 
borrowers may . . . be worse off than before they participated.” SIGTARP QUARTERLY 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 171 (2010), available at  http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/
congress/2010/October2010_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf; see also Jean Braucher, 
Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis:  Lessons From the Lackluster First Year of the 
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727 (2010); Paul Kiel & 
Olga Pierce, Homeowner Questionnaire Shows Banks Violating Gov’t Program Rules, 
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 16, 2010, 8:02 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/homeowner-
questionnaire-shows-banks-violating-govt-program-rules. 
 11. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:  A REVIEW OF 
TREASURY’S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS 95–96 (2010), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf. 
 12. In late 2009, the foreclosure rate was nearly four times the historic average. CONG. 
OVERSIGHT PANEL, OCTOBER OVERSIGHT REPORT:  AN ASSESSMENT OF FORECLOSURE 
MITIGATION EFFORTS AFTER SIX MONTHS 6 (2009), available at 
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-100909-report.pdf.  More than 15% of subprime 
mortgages and 24% of subprime adjustable rate mortgages were in foreclosure. Id. 
 13. See John Eggum, Katherine Porter & Tara Twomey, Saving Homes in Bankruptcy:  
Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1125 (explaining 
that the bankruptcy process will not allow many struggling families to keep their homes 
because such families “cannot keep up with their ongoing mortgage payments or cannot do 
so while curing the defaults on their mortgage loans”); Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the 
Foreclosure Crisis:  Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 571 
(noting that the bankruptcy system “is incapable of handling the current home-foreclosure 
crisis because of the special protection it gives to most residential-mortgage claims”); 
Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 121, 176 (2008) (noting, in the context of high and unexpected fees charged by 
mortgage holders, that “the amounts of mortgage proofs of claim have direct effects on 
bankruptcy’s usefulness as a home-saving device”). 
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advantage of Code provisions that give it more than that to which it would 
be entitled under state law, that creditor must act in an “honest but 
unfortunate” manner.  It is well established that debtors must be both honest 
and unfortunate to take advantage of bankruptcy’s benefits,14 and many 
sections of the Code explicitly reflect that policy.  Absent from statements 
of bankruptcy policy, however, is the idea that creditors must be honest but 
unfortunate in order to receive the full benefits of bankruptcy.  
Nevertheless, such a requirement is implicit in the Code’s equitable 
subordination provision, § 510(c), which allows a court to subordinate all or 
part of a creditor’s claim to other claims using “principles of equitable 
subordination.”15
To develop this argument, in Part I I discuss the special treatment of 
home mortgagees in Chapter 13 and explain the major changes in lending 
practices in the three decades since that special treatment was codified.   In 
Part II, I explore bankruptcy history to explain how bankruptcy evolved as a 
system that punishes undesirable pre-bankruptcy behavior by debtors, while 
ignoring such behavior by most creditors.  In Part III, I explain equitable 
subordination in detail and show that although it has historically been used 
to subordinate the claims of corporate insiders, nothing in its history limits 
it to that use.  In Part IV, I discuss the use of equitable subordination to 
subordinate the claims of abusive mortgage lenders and also address some 
possible objections to its use.  I conclude this Article by urging courts to 
both alleviate the current mortgage crisis and discourage reckless lending in 
the future by using equitable subordination to modify home mortgage 
claims. 
  In this Article, I discuss equitable subordination, a tool 
used primarily in business bankruptcy to subordinate the claims of 
corporate insiders to the claims of non-insider creditors, and argue that 
judges can and should use this tool to modify the claims of home mortgage 
creditors who engage in abusive lending practices.   
I. HOME MORTGAGES AND CHAPTER 13 
A. The History of the Anti-Modification Provision 
A key component of the bankruptcy reforms in 1978 was Chapter 13 of 
the Code, which allows individual debtors to pay off a portion of their debts 
while retaining their assets.  Chapter 13 was a debtor-friendly alternative to 
its predecessor, Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,16 which 
required the consent of every secured creditor to every plan of 
reorganization.17
 
 14. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1047 n.1 (1987) (citing Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877), as the 
first case to state the bankruptcy goal of providing relief to the “honest citizen”). 
  A debtor who wishes to keep her home in bankruptcy 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006). 
 16. ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. 
 17. See Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1154; Robert M. Zinman & Novica 
Petrovski, The Home Mortgage and Chapter 13:  An Essay on Unintended Consequences, 17 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 133, 135 (2009). 
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would likely file under Chapter 13 because generally a Chapter 13 debtor 
keeps all of her property and pays her creditors some portion of their claims 
over a three- to-five-year repayment plan.18
Because home mortgages are typically payable over fifteen to thirty 
years, it is unlikely that the typical debtor would be able to pay her 
mortgage debt in full in a Chapter 13 plan.  Chapter 13 allows such a debtor 
to pay her mortgage debt over the term of the original mortgage; if the 
debtor has twenty-six years left to pay on her mortgage loan, she can pay 
the debt over the remaining twenty-six years of the term.  The debtor is also 
permitted to cure any pre-bankruptcy payment default by paying all 
mortgage arrears during the plan term.
 
19
Although Chapter 13 gives the homeowner two benefits—the ability to 
pay her loan over its original term and the ability to cure defaults—it denies 
her a significant benefit that bankruptcy debtors receive with respect to 
other loans—loan modification.  A Chapter 13 plan can “modify the rights 
of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a security 
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.”
 
20  There is 
not much legislative history explaining the reasons for this section, but its 
often-stated justification is to preserve the flow of funds into the home 
mortgage lending market.21
This anti-modification provision bestows unusual treatment on home 
mortgagees.  The Code allows debtors to modify their other creditors’ pre-
bankruptcy deals in several ways.  As a general rule, the terms of the 
debtor’s Chapter 13 plan replace the terms of her pre-bankruptcy 
contracts.
 
22  For instance, a debtor may propose in her Chapter 13 plan to 
pay a creditor a lower interest rate than she was paying under the original 
contract, thus reducing the amount of her monthly payments.  Most secured 
creditors are entitled to the present value of their secured claims,23
 
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4). 
 and the 
 19. Id. § 1322(b)(5) (allowing a debtor to cure defaults and maintain payments on long-
term debt). 
 20. Id. § 1322(b)(2) (emphasis added).  For an excellent discussion of the special 
treatment of home mortgagees under the Code, see generally Marianne B. Culhane, Home 
Improvement?  Home Mortgages and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 29 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 467 (1996). 
 21. See, e.g., Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Culhane, supra note 20, at 467; Levitin, supra note 13, at 573 n.26 (setting forth 
the scant legislative history, which consists of a discussion in a Senate hearing among 
Edward J. Kulik of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, his counsel Robert 
E. O’Malley, and Senator Dennis De Concini); Zinman & Petrovski, supra note 17, at 137–
38 (adding that, with its appeal to those who decried “red lining”—the practice of refusing to 
make loans in low-income or minority neighborhoods—the anti-modification provision was 
also “an experiment in social engineering”). 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (stating that the “provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor 
and each creditor”); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1327.02[1][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry 
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010), available at LexisNexis. 
 23. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5). 
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U.S. Supreme Court has held that the interest rate in the original loan 
contract is not the interest rate used to calculate present value.24
It is often said that bankruptcy preserves state law property rights,
 
25 and 
this is reflected in the Code’s provisions governing claims.  Generally, a 
secured creditor who is owed more than the value of the collateral securing 
its claim must receive in a Chapter 11 or 13 plan at least the present value 
of the secured portion of its claim, plus at least the same percentage of its 
unsecured claim as it would receive in a Chapter 7 case.26  The Code thus 
bifurcates undersecured claims by giving undersecured creditors two 
claims:  a secured claim in the amount of the collateral value and an 
unsecured claim in the amount by which the outstanding loan amount 
exceeds the value of the collateral.27  If a debtor owns a four-year-old car 
worth $10,000 on which she owes $15,000, she will be required to pay the 
present value of $10,000 in her Chapter 13 plan.28  The remaining $5000 
claim will be paid pro-rata with the other non-priority unsecured claims 
against her.29  This full payment of only the secured portion of a secured 
lender’s claim is often referred to as “cramdown.”30  Cramdown reflects a 
foreclosure distribution because if the debtor had decided not to file for 
bankruptcy but to let the car lender exercise its state law rights, that creditor 
would be guaranteed only the value of the collateral. 31
A debtor cannot modify the terms of a home mortgage loan, however.  





 24. The Supreme Court has held that the interest rate to be used to pay present value is 
the prime rate plus an “appropriate risk adjustment.” Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 
479 (2004).  The loan at issue in Till was a subprime truck loan that carried a 21% interest 
rate. Id. at 471. 
  During her plan, she must cure all arrears by paying 
 25. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created 
and defined by state law.”). 
 26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(5).  The 2005 amendments to the Code appear to 
bestow special treatment to several other creditors in Chapter 13 under the “hanging 
paragraph” to 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (stating that § 506, which provides for the bifurcation of 
undersecured loans into secured and unsecured claims, does not apply to purchase money-
secured loans obtained within 910 days of the bankruptcy petition to acquire an automobile 
for the personal use of the debtor and all secured loans incurred within one year of the 
petition).  The hanging paragraph prohibits only bifurcation; a debtor may modify such loans 
in other ways, such as by lowering the interest rate. See In re Johnson, 337 B.R. 269, 273 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006). 
 27. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b). 
 28. Id. § 1325(a)(5).  I use a four-year-old car as an example to avoid the application of 
the hanging paragraph discussed in note 26, supra. 
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). 
 30. It is also referred to as “lien stripping” or “strip down.” ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY 
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 284–85, 301 (6th ed. 2009).  
Another use of the term “cramdown” refers to the Chapter 11 plan that is confirmed over the 
objection of a class of creditors or interests. See Adam J. Levitin, Helping Homeowners:  
Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 8 n.32 (Jan. 19, 
2009), http://www.hlpronline.com/Levitin_HLPR_011909.pdf. 
 31. See U.C.C. § 9-615(a) (2000). 
 32. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (forbidding modification of home mortgages); id. 
§ 1322(b)(5) (allowing debtor to cure defaults and maintain payments on long-term debt); id. 
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all missed payments,33
Until the Supreme Court’s 1993 decision in Nobelman v. American 
Savings Bank
 so the plan payments will likely exceed her regular 
payments. 
34 it was not clear that the prohibition on modifying home 
mortgages meant no cramdown.  When Congress considered amendments 
to the Code in 1991 and 1992 to clarify the anti-modification provision to 
specifically allow cramdown, representatives of the lending industry voiced 
opposition, claiming that cramdown would reduce lending in lower-income 
communities35 and have a negative effect on the mortgage-backed 
securities market.36
In Nobelman, the Court held that the proscription against modification of 
the mortgagee’s rights prohibited not only changes to the interest rate and 
payment schedule but also prohibited cramdown.  In its opinion, the Court 
discussed the rights that a mortgagee holds under a mortgage and noted that 
one right of any secured creditor is the right to retain its lien for the full 
amount of the debt owed to it until the debt is paid in full.
 
37  As explained 
above, the Code permits debtors to modify this right with respect to most 
undersecured creditors.  As a result of Nobelman, however, a debtor who 
owes $350,000 on a home worth $250,000 will not be able to bifurcate the 
lender’s claim into a secured and an unsecured claim.38
The anti-modification provision gives home mortgage creditors more 
than they would receive under state law.
  Her entire 
$350,000 debt will be treated as a secured claim despite the fact that the 
house is worth only $250,000.  If she does not pay the $350,000 in full, she 
will likely lose her house. 
39  By requiring the debtor to pay 
the home mortgage creditor the full amount outstanding on the loan 
regardless of the home’s value, the Code grants a property right that exists 
only in bankruptcy.40
 
§ 1328 (excepting long-term debt from discharge).  These restrictions on modification also 
apply to home mortgages in Chapter 11. Id. § 1123(b)(5). 
  Only the creditor holding the mortgage on the 
 33. Id. § 1322(b)(5). 
 34. 508 U.S. 324 (1993). 
 35. See Veryl Victoria Miles, The Bifurcation of Undersecured Residential Mortgages 
Under § 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code:  The Final Resolution, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 207, 
257–58 (1993) (discussing the Government National Mortgage Association’s (GNMA) 
concern that lenders would “perhaps reduce home lending activities to individuals in 
communities where the property values are at ‘potential cramdown risk’”). 
 36. See id. at 266–67 (discussing concerns raised by representatives of the Mortgage 
Bankers Association of America). 
 37. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329. 
 38. Id. at 326–27. 
 39. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 40. In Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1992), the Supreme Court held that 
§ 506 of the Code did not allow a debtor to void the undersecured portion of a secured 
creditor’s lien, notwithstanding the Code’s statement, in § 506(d) that “to the extent that a 
lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is 
void.”  For detailed critiques of Dewsnup, see generally David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of 
Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1996); Margaret Howard, 
Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 513 (1992).  Notwithstanding 
the Dewsnup holding, undersecured creditors are paid only the value of their collateral, 
either after foreclosure or at the time a plan of reorganization is confirmed.  Chapter 13 
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debtor’s principal residence gets this special treatment; a creditor with a 
mortgage on a vacation home or on business property does not.41
Since 2007, Congress has considered at least five bills that would have 
allowed home mortgage modification,
 
42 none of which became law.  The 
bills took several different approaches to mortgage modification, ranging 
from a neutral approach that would have allowed modification of all 
mortgages,43 to an approach favoring unfortunate debtors by allowing 
modification only if the debtor had insufficient income to make payments,44 
to an approach punishing “bad” mortgagees by allowing modification of 
only “non-traditional” mortgages.45  One proposal would have allowed 
modification only of those mortgage loans initiated before September 
2007.46
B. Twenty-First Century Mortgage Lending 
  As legislative action to treat home mortgage creditors like other 
secured creditors seems unlikely, it is imperative that courts find a way to 
deny this special treatment to abusive mortgage lenders. 
Mortgage and other consumer lending today looks little like the lending 
of the 1970s, when the Code was enacted.  By the beginning of the recent 
mortgage crisis, many home loans had such high loan-to-value ratios that 
the amount of mortgage debt exceeded the value of the home.47
 
requires the debtor to make payments equal to the outstanding amount of the loan.  
Therefore, the preservation of the home mortgagee’s entire lien by requiring full payment is 
the grant of a property right that is non-existent under state law. 
  The 
 41. Courts have held that a debtor who wishes to pay a stripped-down mortgage on 
property that is not his primary residence must do so within the statutory Chapter 13 plan 
period. Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2004).  
I address this case in more detail in Part IV, infra. 
 42. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong.; Helping 
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S. 2136, 110th Cong.; Homeowners 
Mortgage and Equity Savings Act, S. 2133, 110th Cong. (2007); Home Owners Mortgage 
and Equity Savings Act of 2007, H.R. 3778, 110th Cong.; Emergency Home Ownership and 
Mortgage Equity Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3609, 110th Cong.  The version of the 
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 that ultimately passed, Pub. L. 111-22, 123 
Stat. 1632 (2009), does not contain a provision allowing modification of home mortgages in 
bankruptcy. 
 43. The version of House Bill 3609 that was introduced in Congress deleted the 
prohibition on modification contained in § 1322(b)(2). See Mark Scarberry, Detailed Chart 
Comparing Provisions of Current Bankruptcy Bills Dealing With Modification of Home 
Mortgages, as of 12/13/2007, AM. BANKR. INST., available at 
http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/UpdatedMortgageModificationLegislationChart.pdf 
[hereinafter Scarberry Chart]. 
 44. S. 2136; see Scarberry Chart, supra note 43. 
 45. H.R. 3609 (as amended); see Scarberry Chart, supra note 43; Markup of H.R. 3609 
and H.R. 3753 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 41 (2007) (statement of 
Rep. Brad Sherman, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/transcripts/transcript071212.pdf (defining 
“nontraditional” mortgage loan as one that permits periodic payments that include only the 
interest due or that do not include the full amount of interest due). 
 46. S. 2133; see Scarberry Chart, supra note 43. 
 47. See Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1158.  At the end of the second 
quarter of 2010, 23% of all residential properties with mortgages were encumbered by 
mortgages that exceeded their value. Press Release, CoreLogic, Negative Equity Report Q2 
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abusive practices that contributed to the current financial crisis48 are well-
chronicled elsewhere,49
In the years preceding the mortgage crisis, new terms, such as 
“predatory” and “subprime,” entered the lending lexicon.  “Subprime” is a 
term that describes both borrowers and loans.  Borrowers who have weak 
credit histories because of late payments, charge-offs, or bankruptcies, or 
who have low credit scores or high debt burdens, fall into the subprime 
borrower category.
 so this section briefly summarizes these practices 
and compares them to traditional lending practices. 
50  “Predatory” refers to loan terms.  Professors Kathleen 
Engel and Patricia McCoy concisely define predatory lending as 
“exploitative high-cost loans to naïve borrowers.”51  According to Engel 
and McCoy, a loan that is “structured to result in seriously disproportionate 
net harm to borrowers” is predatory.52  The loans often made to subprime 
borrowers, with their high fees, low teaser rates of interest, high overall 
interest rates, and high loan-to-value ratios,53 can be considered predatory.  
In this Article, I refer to lending practices that tend to decrease the 
borrower’s wealth as “abusive” lending practices.54
There are several key ways in which modern mortgage loans differ from 
traditional ones.  In the 1930s, the average down payment on a home was 
40%.
 
55  In later years, people considered 20% to be a “standard, moderate 
down payment.”56
 
2010 (Aug. 26, 2010), available at http://www.corelogic.com/
uploadedFiles/Pages/About_Us/ResearchTrends/CL_Q2_2010_Negative_Equity_FINAL.pd
f.  Nevada had the highest percentage of underwater mortgages, with 68% of its residential 
mortgages in negative equity. Id. 
  By 2006, that down payment had declined to 2% for 
 48. Even the bankers admit this. See First Public Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis Inquiry 
Comm’n 9 (2010) (testimony of Jamie Dimon, Chairman & CEO, JPMorgan Chase & Co.), 
available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0113-Dimon.pdf (stating that “new and 
poorly underwritten mortgage products” proved costly for the entire financial system); see 
also Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos:  The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the Social 
Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 299 (2008). 
 49. See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Homeownership:  American Dream or Illusion of 
Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573 (2009); Brescia, supra note 48; Kurt Eggert, The Great 
Collapse:  How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1257 
(2009); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets:  The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002); see Alan M. White, The 
Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 617 (2008). 
 50. Brescia, supra note 48, at 287. 
 51. Engel & McCoy, supra note 49, at 1257. 
 52. Id. at 1260. 
 53. Brescia, supra note 48, at 287. 
 54. I use the term “abusive” because some states have regulated predatory lending and 
have defined the regulated loans in varying ways. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-l 
(McKinney 2008) (regulating “high-cost home loans”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1E 
(West 2006) (restricting “high-cost home loan[s]”); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 456.503, 
456.511 (West 2010) (prohibiting certain loan terms in mortgage loans less than $100,000).  
For purposes of equitable subordination, however, a court’s ability to equitably subordinate a 
home mortgage claim should not depend on whether the debtor’s home state has defined that 
loan as predatory. 
 55. Adams, supra note 49, at 601 n.156. 
 56. Id. at 601–02 (tracing mortgage terms from the 1930s to the present).  The average 
down payment for repeat homebuyers in 2006 was 16%. Id. at 602. 
2011] THE HONEST BUT UNFORTUNATE CREDITOR 1609 
first-time homebuyers.57  One popular loan product was the “80/20 loan”, 
which allowed a borrower to obtain both a first mortgage loan for 80% of 
the purchase price and a second mortgage loan for 20% of the price, with 
the borrower contributing nothing as a down payment.58
At the time that Chapter 13 was enacted, most home mortgage loans were 
made by savings and loan associations and tended to be fixed-rate loans 
with 30-year repayment periods.
 
59  The fact that the rates were fixed is 
significant because one traditional measure of housing affordability is based 
on the relationship between monthly mortgage and other debt payments to 
the borrower’s monthly income.60  When this relationship is calculated on 
an adjustable rate loan, a loan that was affordable at its inception becomes 
unaffordable when the rate resets.61
Adjustable rate mortgage loans have proliferated in recent years.  These 
loans carry a low fixed introductory rate and then reset to an adjustable rate 
of interest after the expiration of the introductory period.  According to one 
estimate, nearly 75% of all securitized subprime mortgage loans originated 
in 2004 and 2005 carried a low fixed teaser rate for two or three years.
 
62  
These adjustable rate loans gave the appearance of affordability because the 
borrowers’ ability to pay the loans was determined using the teaser rate, but 
such affordability was often lost when the rate reset.63  Although the teaser 
rate was a lower rate than the ultimate interest rate, subprime loans carried 
higher rates of interest than prime loans.  According to one study, there is a 
two percentage point difference between the highest interest rate on prime 
loans and the lowest rate on subprime loans.64
Traditionally, mortgage loans were amortized over a thirty year period.  
Therefore, monthly payments on these loans included interest and an 
increasing amount of principal, enabling the homeowner to slowly build 




 57. Id. 
  In recent years, however, 
 58. Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown:  How Did It Happen and How 
Will It End?, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2007, at 13, 15. 
 59. Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1156. 
 60. See Adams, supra note 49, at 579–80 (citing the widely used 28/36 rule, under 
which monthly mortgage payments are affordable if they make up no more than 28% of the 
borrower’s gross income, and if mortgage payments, combined with all other debt payments, 
make up no more than 36% of the borrower’s gross income). 
 61. For this reason, Professor Kristen Adams suggests that more attention be paid to 
another traditional measure of affordability, the relationship of home purchase price to 
family income.  Under that measure, a home is affordable if it costs no more than 2.5 times 
family income. Id. at 584. 
 62. On Possible Responses to Rising Mortgage Foreclosures, Before the Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearing110/htbair041707.pdf. 
 63. See Eggert, supra note 49, at 1291; Krinsman, supra note 58, at 14–15. 
 64. R. Stephen Painter Jr., Subprime Lending, Suboptimal Bankruptcy:  A Proposal to 
Amend §§ 522(f)(1)(B) and 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code to Protect Subprime 
Mortgage Borrowers and Their Unsecured Creditors, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81, 89 (2006). 
 65. See REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3E.02[1] (Matthew Bender 2010), available at 
LexisNexis (describing an alternative mortgage transaction as any mortgage that does not 
conform to the “traditional fully amortized, fixed interest rate mortgage loan” (citing First 
Gibraltar Bank, F.S.B. v. Morales, 19 F.3d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1994))). 
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many borrowers took out interest-only loans.  Borrowers with interest-only 
loans are required to make monthly payments of interest only (as the name 
implies) for the first few years of the loan term.  After that period, the loan 
“resets” to an amortizing loan with higher monthly payments including both 
interest and principal.66  Because it was unlikely that borrowers would be 
able to afford payments after the loan converted to an amortizing loan, 
lenders relied on the borrower’s ability to sell the home for at least the loan 
amount, or alternatively to refinance the loan.67
Even more onerous than the interest-only loan was the option adjustable 
rate mortgage, or “Option ARM.”  The Option ARM allowed the borrower 
a choice of monthly payments ranging from payments that would amortize 
the loan over fifteen years on the high end to payments that would not be 
sufficient to pay the monthly interest on the loan at the low end.
 
68  These 
loans, originally intended for sophisticated investors and persons who 
expected an increase in income, were often offered to homebuyers who 
could be described as “average.”69  Instead of enabling borrowers to build 
wealth, negative amortization loans deplete home equity and therefore harm 
the debtor’s other creditors because the shortfall in interest is added to the 
outstanding principal of the loan.70
Another major development in mortgage lending was the reduced 
documentation of a borrower’s income and assets.  Traditionally, borrowers 
were required to provide full documentation of their financial condition, but 
banks would sometimes excuse borrowers who were self-employed 
professionals from the obligation to provide full financial documentation.  
In recent years, subprime and first-time borrowers were offered these no- 
and low-documentation loans.
 
71  According to one estimate, 46% of all 
subprime mortgage loans in 2006 were no-documentation loans.72
Abusive loans often carry high fees.  It is estimated that the fees on 
subprime loans are six times greater than those on prime loans.
 
73  Subprime 
lenders often charged above-market prices for credit reports and document 
preparation and sometimes charged for services that were never provided.74
 
 66. Interest-only loans were rare until recently.  In 2004, almost half of all homebuyers 
in California used an interest-only loan to purchase their homes. David Streitfeld, The House 
Trap:  As an Exotic Mortgage Resets, Payments Skyrocket, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at B1. 
  
Because cash-poor subprime borrowers were often unable to pay these fees 
upfront, lenders included these high fees in the amount financed, thus 
 67. See Adams, supra note 49, at 606. 
 68. See, e.g., Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1159; John Leland, Loans 
That Looked Easy Pose Threats to Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at A12. 
 69. See Leland, supra note 68. 
 70. See Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra note 13, at 1159–60 (explaining that a 
borrower with a negative amortization loan will not build equity in her home); Painter, supra 
note 64, at 94 (explaining negative amortization loans). 
 71. See Eggert, supra note 49, at 1285; Krinsman, supra note 58, at 15. 
 72. See White, supra note 49, at 634. 
 73. Painter, supra note 64, at 93. 
 74. Engel & McCoy, supra note 49, at 1266. 
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further decreasing the homeowner’s chance of building equity in the 
home.75
A major factor contributing to the proliferation of questionable 
mortgages was securitization.  Mortgage brokers and originators were 
rewarded for quantity, not quality:  the more loans made, the more money 
for the originator.
 
76  Securitization fueled some of the abusive practices 
described above; for instance, low documentation loans enabled originators 
to hide the true riskiness of a loan.77  In addition, securitization also led to 
the overappraisals that contributed to high loan-to-value ratios.  In the 
securitization market, loan originators had an incentive to overappraise so 
that the loan-to-value ratios on the loans they sold would look more 
attractive.78
Home mortgagees were given special protections in 1978 to preserve the 
flow of funds into the home mortgage lending market.
 
79  When discussing 
whether this policy requires that today’s subprime lenders receive that same 
protection, it is important to consider the purposes for which many 
subprime loans were made.  Most subprime mortgage loans were not used 
by first-time homebuyers, nor were they used to purchase a home at all; 
rather, they were used to refinance an existing loan.80  Because a portion of 
most refinance loans is used to pay for non-housing related items, these 
loans are only loosely related to any policy of encouraging 
homeownership.81
With their high rates of interest, high fees, and high loan-to-value ratios, 
these abusive loan products prevented homeowners from building equity in 
their homes.  Moreover, lax underwriting standards led banks to lend 




Congress prohibited the modification of home mortgages in 1978 and the 
Supreme Court interpreted this prohibition to give mortgage lenders full 
payment regardless of home value in 1993.
  The debtors/homeowners are not the only ones 
harmed by these abusive practices.  By depleting the debtor’s assets and 
hindering his ability to build wealth, these abusive lending practices harmed 
the debtor’s other creditors as well. 
83
 
 75. Painter, supra note 
  It strains belief to think that 
Congress and the Court intended that lenders that engage in abusive lending 
practices be entitled to these protections.  Requiring home mortgagees to 
64, at 92. 
 76. Krinsman, supra note 58, at 13–14. 
 77. Eggert, supra note 49, at 1286. 
 78. Id. at 1287. 
 79. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 80. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and Mortgage Lending:  The Homeowner 
Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19, 25 (2004); White, supra note 49, at 621. 
 81. In fact, a good argument can be made that subprime lending has reduced 
homeownership because from 1998 to 2006, “the number of completed subprime mortgage 
foreclosures exceeded the number of first-time homebuyers who used a subprime mortgage.” 
White, supra note 49, at 622. 
 82. See Eggert, supra note 49, at 1268–70. 
 83. See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. 
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come to bankruptcy court as honest but unfortunate creditors would reserve 
Chapter 13’s favorable treatment to those lenders whose loans assist 
homebuyers in achieving the desirable status of homeowner. 
II. HONEST BUT UNFORTUNATE DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 
Both debtors and creditors come to bankruptcy court to ask for something 
that they would not receive under non-bankruptcy law.  A debtor comes to 
court looking to discharge pre-petition debts84 and also wants the court to 
stay collection actions against him.85
Creditors also come to court seeking favors.  Unsecured creditors want to 
stop the race to collect from the debtor in order to preserve some chance of 
recovery.
  These requests invoke a major 
bankruptcy policy:  relief for the honest but unfortunate debtor.  The Code’s 
rules reflect this policy, and only a debtor who plays by the Code’s rules 
governing his behavior both before his bankruptcy filing and during the 
bankruptcy case is eligible for this relief. 
86  They seek the full benefit of the automatic stay, which, by 
halting all collection efforts against the debtor and the debtor’s property, 
ensures that all creditors have a chance at the debtor’s assets.  They also 
want to make sure that their claims are afforded appropriate priority.87
Undersecured home mortgagees come to bankruptcy court looking for a 
big favor:  they ask the court to give them greater protection than that 
provided under state law.  To receive such special treatment, the home 
mortgage creditor’s pre-bankruptcy behavior should be carefully 
scrutinized.  Yet there is no explicit policy of requiring creditors to be 
honest but unfortunate to receive bankruptcy’s benefits. 
  
These requests invoke another policy, that of the equal treatment of 
similarly situated creditors.  Creditors are also required to play by the 
Code’s rules, but these rules focus on creditor behavior affecting the 
administration of the bankruptcy case rather than on their behavior in their 
pre-bankruptcy relationships with borrowers. 
The Code contains rules governing debtor and creditor behavior.  The 
rules can be characterized as either administrative or moral, with 
administrative rules punishing actions during the bankruptcy case that 
hinder the administration of the case and the moral rules punishing 
primarily pre-bankruptcy behavior that we consider to violate some 
standard of acceptable conduct.  The Code’s sections are explicit in 
requiring both administrative and moral compliance from the debtor, thus 
granting relief only to the “honest but unfortunate” debtor.  At first glance, 
however, it seems that any requirement that a creditor behave in a 
prescribed manner is primarily based on administrative factors.  Thus, the 
Code does not appear to embody any policy of affording relief only to 
 
 84. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2006) (excepting listed debts of individuals from discharge). 
 85. Id. § 362(a) (stating that all collection efforts against the debtor and its property must 
cease upon a bankruptcy filing). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. § 507. 
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honest but unfortunate creditors.  While hundreds of articles about 
bankruptcy law refer to the “honest but unfortunate debtor,”88 not one in 
either the Lexis or HeinOnline databases contains the phrase “honest but 
unfortunate creditor.”89
Historically, bankruptcy has included a “bad debtor” story.  The Code’s 
rules governing debtor behavior reflect this story.  There is no 
corresponding general “bad creditor” story, however, and the Code’s rules 
regarding creditor behavior reflect this absence.  There are two Code 
sections that allow a court to take a creditor’s pre-bankruptcy dealings with 
the debtor into account, however:  § 522(f), which allows the debtor to 
avoid non-purchase money, non-possessory security interests in enumerated 
household goods and § 510(c), which gives the court the power to equitably 
subordinate the claims of creditors who engage in inequitable behavior that 
harms other creditors.  The first sets forth a narrow rule that punishes a 
specific type of undesirable lender behavior, but the second could allow a 
court to deny full bankruptcy relief to creditors who engage in a wide range 
of questionable behavior. 
 
A. Ensuring That Debtors Are Both Honest and Unfortunate 
Bankruptcy law grants relief to the honest but unfortunate debtor.  
Although this statement was first found in American case law in the late 
1800s,90 even the earliest bankruptcy laws distinguished between honest 
and dishonest debtors.  In ancient times and in the early United States, 
insolvency for all reasons, honest and dishonest, was considered to be the 
result of moral failure or some kind of malfeasance.91
Despite this generally-held view of debtors as bad actors, early debtor-
creditor laws distinguished debtors rendered insolvent by misfortune from 
those rendered insolvent by bad acts.  Insolvency laws throughout history 
have punished dishonest debtors more severely than honest ones, an 
important distinction when the punishment for dishonest debtors could be 
  Early bankruptcy 
laws therefore were punitive because persons who failed to pay their debts 
were viewed as wrongdoers, even criminals. 
 
 88. A very unscientific search found 355 articles (including student comments and 
notes) in the Lexis U.S. Law Reviews and Journals database that mentioned “honest but 
unfortunate debtor” at least once, LEXIS TOTAL RESEARCH SYSTEM, www.lexis.com (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011), and 431 articles (including student articles and notes) in the 
HeinOnline Core U.S. Journals that contained the same phrase, HEINONLINE, 
www.heinonline.org (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
 89. A search of “honest but unfortunate creditor” on January 23, 2011 found no articles 
on either HeinOnline or Lexis. 
 90. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1047 & n.1 (tracing the use of a similar statement to 
Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877)). 
 91. See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS:  BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF 
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 2–3 (2002) (describing views on insolvency in the early United 
States); Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 
223, 237 (1917) (describing the ancient view of insolvency as something “irregular and 
fraudulent”); Painter, supra note 64, at 103. 
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imprisonment,92 slavery,93 or even capital punishment.94  Better treatment 
for unfortunate debtors did not mean discharge, however, because early 
debtor-creditor law granted no forgiveness to debtors.95
Discharge became part of debtor-creditor laws because courts need 
accurate information about a debtor’s financial affairs in order to administer 
a bankruptcy case.  The original idea behind discharge, which became part 
of English bankruptcy law in the early 1700s, was to encourage the debtor’s 
cooperation in the dismantling of his own financial affairs because the 
debtor was in a better position than his creditors to know his financial 
condition and transactions.
 
96  Likewise, the earliest American federal 
bankruptcy law denied relief to those who withheld assets or information.97
The Code’s discharge provisions illustrate this administrative component 
of the honest but unfortunate debtor.  The Code allows a court to deny 
discharge to the debtor who does not keep adequate books and records of 
her pre-bankruptcy transactions,
  
Therefore, honesty during the bankruptcy case was required of debtors for 
administrative reasons. 
98 the debtor who makes a false oath in 
connection with the case,99 and the debtor who withholds information about 
her finances from the trustee or the court.100  All of these debtors are 
punished severely for taking actions that impede a fair distribution of assets 
to creditors, as a discharge denial means that they will be denied bankruptcy 
relief and will emerge from bankruptcy liable for all of their pre-petition 
debts.  Discharge denial in this context furthers the original purpose of the 
discharge:  to encourage debtor cooperation.101
Remnants of the old view of debt as the product of moral failure can still 
be found in the Code’s debtor conduct requirements.  Debtors are punished 
not only for financial misconduct but also for some types of non-financial 
misconduct.  The Code punishes financial misconduct by allowing a court 
to deny discharge to a debtor who made fraudulent transfers in anticipation 
 
 
 92. See Levinthal, supra note 91, at 238 (explaining the Roman cessio bonorum, a 
voluntary composition with creditors which allowed an “innocent insolvent” to avoid arrest 
and imprisonment). 
 93. See MANN, supra note 91, at 65 (explaining that many American colonies permitted 
insolvent debtors to be forced into servitude to their creditors for as long as seven years); 
Levinthal, supra note 91, at 230, 237–38 (discussing the treatment of insolvent debtors by 
the Code of Hammurabi and in ancient Rome). 
 94. See Emily Kadens, The Last Bankrupt Hanged:  Balancing Incentives in the 
Development of Bankruptcy Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1261–65 (2010) (describing the Act of 
4 & 5 Anne, which made fraudulent bankruptcy a capital offense). 
 95. See MANN, supra note 91, at 2–3. 
 96. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1049; Kadens, supra note 94, at 1269–70 (discussing 
discharge and capital punishment as two methods by which the debtor’s cooperation was 
encouraged in early English bankruptcy law). 
 97. See MANN, supra note 91, at 223. 
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (2006) (denying discharge to a debtor who has failed to keep 
or preserve any recorded information from which her financial condition can be ascertained). 
 99. Id. § 727(a)(4)(A). 
 100. Id. § 727(a)(4)(D). 
 101. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1053. 
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of bankruptcy.102  That debtor did not hinder the administration of the 
estate, rather, she depleted it before bankruptcy.  This conduct can be 
punished under state law,103 but the Code provides for a harsher 
punishment:  no bankruptcy relief.104  A debtor’s morally objectionable 
financial misconduct can also result in non-dischargeable debts.  Many of 
the “rifle shot” exceptions, which except individual claims from discharge, 
are based on bad debtor financial behavior in the claim’s creation.  For 
instance, the Code excepts from discharge debts obtained by “false 
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud.”105  This provision allows 
credit card companies to contest the discharge of charges that were made by 
a debtor who, at the time she used her card, either had no intention to pay 
the charges or knew that she “would be unable to live up to the obligation 
and pay the charges.”106  A claim arising out of the debtor’s fraud while 
acting in a fiduciary capacity is likewise non-dischargeable.107
Several non-dischargeable debts are unrelated to financial misconduct, 
however.  For example, debts for “willful and malicious injury” to another 
person or to the property of another person
 
108 and debts for death or 
personal injury caused by the debtor’s drunk driving109 are non-
dischargeable.  These exceptions, while not punishing pre-bankruptcy 
financial dishonesty, reflect the view that there is some bad behavior that 
renders a debtor unworthy of bankruptcy relief.110
In short, debtors have long been required to be “honest but unfortunate” 
in order to receive the benefits of bankruptcy for two reasons:  the court 
needed the cooperation of the debtors in the bankruptcy case and debtors 
were the “bad guys.”  Although bankruptcy law is no longer based on the 





 102. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (denying a discharge to a debtor who, within one year of the 
bankruptcy petition, transfers property with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor); 
see In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986, 988–89 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying discharge to a debtor who 
had transferred about $35,000 of non-exempt property to pay down a mortgage on his 
exempt homestead). 
 bankruptcy relief remains reserved for those debtors who deal 
 103. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 155–56 (2006). 
 104. See supra notes 95, 99–102 and accompanying text. 
 105. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). 
 106. See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. v. Dorsey (In re Dorsey), 120 B.R. 592, 
596 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).  The facts in Dorsey show some questionable behavior on the 
part of both the debtor and the credit card company.  The debtor, who had not been 
employed in the decade before she filed for bankruptcy and who lived on $480 a month in 
Social Security payments, managed to charge over $100,000 on seven American Express 
cards. Id. at 593–94.  She paid only the minimum amounts due each month under the 
American Express “Travel & Sign” program. Id. at 594–95.  After American Express argued 
that $50,000 of its claim should be excepted from discharge, the court held that about 
$25,000 of her debt to American Express was non-dischargeable. See id. at 593–97. 
 107. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 
 108. Id. § 523(a)(6). 
 109. Id. § 523(a)(9). 
 110. See Howard, supra note 14, at 1052–53. 
 111. See id. at 1052. But see Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail?  An 
Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 385 (2008) (referring to the 
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honestly with the court and who behave in a morally acceptable manner 
before filing for bankruptcy. 
B. Code Provisions Designed To Ensure Good Creditor Behavior 
At first glance, the Code does not appear to require that creditors also be 
“honest but unfortunate” to take advantage of bankruptcy’s benefits.  The 
American respect for freedom of contract in both consumer112 and 
business113 transactions may be one reason why there is not a pervasive 
bankruptcy story line of the dishonest creditor.  In cases in which a creditor 
arguably acted negligently, it is often the case that the debtor’s behavior is 
seen as worse.  Cases involving credit card debt are good examples of this, 
with courts balancing imprudent extensions of credit against the behavior of 
debtors who may have borrowed money that they had no intention of 
repaying.114  Stories of credit card companies that distributed pre-approved 
cards without inquiring into the creditworthiness of the individual receiving 
the card115 are often drowned out by stories of debtors who borrowed 
money far in excess of their ability to pay and used bankruptcy to escape 
their obligations.116
The idea that creditors do not act in morally objectionable ways is 
reflected in the Code provisions that deny creditors the full benefit of 
bankruptcy.  These provisions primarily punish administrative misconduct.  
For example, a creditor who receives timely notice of the debtor’s petition 
but nevertheless files a late proof of claim will find its claim subordinated 
to all other unsecured claims.
  As a result, bankruptcy law has not been influenced by 
an often-repeated “bad creditor” story. 
117
When creditors are punished for their pre-bankruptcy actions, they are 
punished for administrative, not moral, reasons.  The trustee’s power to 
  This is an administrative rule that 
punishes a creditor whose failure to act hinders the orderly distribution of 
the debtor’s assets. 
 
media debates preceding the adoption of the 2005 amendments to the Code, which portrayed 
debtors as “deadbeats who abused the system”). 
 112. Other countries are more aggressive about policing consumer loan contracts. See 
John A. E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 
405, 421–22 (explaining foreign laws that place special responsibilities on lenders). 
 113. One example of a failed attempt to impose an “honest but unfortunate” standard on 
creditors can be found in the 1980s lender liability litigation boom.  These suits tended to fail 
as they were brought by sophisticated parties against their lenders.  The reported cases favor 
the lenders in these cases by a margin of three to one. A. Brooke Overby, Bondage, 
Domination and the Art of the Deal:  An Assessment of Judicial Strategies in Lender 
Liability Good Faith Litigation, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 966 (1993). 
 114. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Margaret Howard, Shifting Risk and Fixing Blame:  The Vexing Problem of 
Credit Card Obligations in Bankruptcy, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 143 (2001) (suggesting that 
“the bankruptcy system has a legitimate stake in requiring the card issuer to show that 
prudent lending practices were followed”). 
 116. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News 
Media, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1091, 1097 (2004) (discussing media reports of abuse of easy 
credit and permissive bankruptcy laws). 
 117. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(3) (2006). 
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avoid preferential transfers118 is an example of such an administrative 
punishment.  Any secured creditor who perfects its interest within ninety 
days before the bankruptcy filing and who would improve its position in 
bankruptcy by doing so stands to have its security interest avoided.119
Sometimes, bankruptcy law favors creditors for their moral worthiness.  
Bankruptcy treats some creditors more harshly than others when one 
creditor is paid a smaller percentage of its claim than another.  When types 
of debts are singled out in bankruptcy, it is because they are more deserving 
rather than less deserving.
  This 
is a harsh punishment, as a valid state law property right is set aside because 
it was obtained too close in time to the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  Secured 
parties are punished both for the innocent failure to perfect their interests 
until the eve of bankruptcy and for knowing attempts to improve their 
positions on the eve of bankruptcy.  This avoiding power protects the 
common pool and furthers the policy of equal treatment of creditors.  While 
the trustee might be punishing “dishonest” creditor behavior by exercising 
the power to avoid preferential transfers, the undesirable creditor behavior 
is related more closely to the imminent bankruptcy case than to the initial 
lending transaction.  Therefore, this rule is purely administrative because it 
equally punishes both innocent and culpable behavior. 
120  Priority creditors include those with claims 
for taxes,121 wages,122 and spousal and child support.123  The 
dischargeability provisions also incorporate the idea of creditor worthiness, 
by including taxes,124 spousal and child support claims,125 and student 
loans126 on the list of non-dischargeable debts.  Even these provisions 
straddle a line between punishing a debtor for dishonest behavior and 
rewarding a particularly deserving creditor.127
 
 118. Id. § 547. 
  Bankruptcy law today 
 119. Creditors are also punished for receiving payments within the ninety day preference 
period. See id. § 547(b) (the trustee can avoid transfers of an interest of the debtor in any 
property if it satisfies the requirements of a voidable preference). 
 120. Others have noticed this discrepancy as well. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 14, at 
1050–59 (noting that the exceptions from discharge for tax claims and support claims are 
based not on the debtor’s behavior, but on a belief that the creditors owed these claims are 
more worthy than other creditors); Philip Schuchman, An Attempt at a “Philosophy of 
Bankruptcy”, 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 432 (1973) (“We assert that every debt is like every 
other debt unless the law declares it to be different (as in the case of taxes and secured 
creditors).”). 
 121. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8). 
 122. Id. § 507(a)(4). 
 123. Id. § 507(a)(1). 
 124. Id. § 523(a)(1). 
 125. Id. § 523(a)(5). 
 126. Id. § 523(a)(8).  This exception has an undue hardship exception, designed to assure 
that a debtor who tries to discharge a student loan obligation is truly unfortunate.  This undue 
hardship exception is rarely granted. See, e.g., Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue 
Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts:  An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of 
Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405 (2005). 
 127. For instance, someone who files for bankruptcy with outstanding student loan debt 
could be classified as “dishonest” because the student loan allowed her to amass human 
capital. Howard, supra note 14, at 1085–86. 
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rewards creditors whose claims are seen as more worthy, but in only rare 
instances are less-worthy creditors punished. 
Viewed in the most positive light, home mortgage creditors in 1978 were 
seen as worthy creditors because their loans furthered the desirable goal of 
homeownership, and Congress rewarded them with protection from 
modification of their claims.  While one way to view this special treatment 
is as a mere gift from Congress to banks,128 the beneficiaries of the special 
treatment warned that cutting off the flow of mortgage credit would harm 
those who had the hardest time achieving the American dream of 
homeownership, particularly those in minority groups.129
Despite the fact that bankruptcy law contains bankruptcy-specific 
punishments for morally objectionable debtor behavior, it yields to state and 
other federal law to punish morally objectionable creditor behavior.  If a 
creditor would be denied recovery under state law because the debtor can 
claim a defense such as illegality or unconscionability, that creditor’s claim 
will not be allowed in bankruptcy.
  Congress treated 
the entire class of home mortgagees as worthy creditors and made no 
exception in the Code for home mortgagees who acted in a morally 
objectionable manner. 
130
If an abusive loan contract is enforceable under non-bankruptcy law, the 
lender’s claim will be allowed in bankruptcy.
  This rule is not a special bankruptcy 
rule; it merely recognizes that a creditor who does not have a valid claim 
outside of bankruptcy does not have a claim in bankruptcy. 
131  In 1975 Professor Vern 
Countryman, concerned about the explosion in consumer credit at that time, 
suggested changes to non-bankruptcy law that would render the claims of 
abusive lenders unenforceable both in and out of bankruptcy.132
 
 128. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Racial Dimensions of Credit and Bankruptcy, 61 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1695, 1710 (2004) (“Mortgage lenders insisted that the [anti-
modification] provisions were more than simply a valentine from Congress . . . .”); Zinman 
& Petrovski, supra note 
  Recently, 
17, at 136 (describing the political climate in 1978 and opining that 
then-President Jimmy Carter and the Democrats in Congress were “not people who would 
normally be pictured as being involved in a cabal with lenders against homeowners”). 
 129. See Miles, supra note 35, at 257–58 (discussing the argument made by GNMA 
during the hearings on the 1994 amendments to the Code that lenders would “perhaps reduce 
home lending activities to individuals in communities where the property values are at 
‘potential cramdown risk’”); Skeel, supra note 128, at 1711 (discussing the argument by the 
lending community that the protection of home mortgages would “ensure a steady stream of 
affordable financing to ordinary Americans who wished to buy their own homes”); Zinman 
& Petrovski, supra note 17, at 137–38 (noting that the argument that allowing modification 
of home mortgages would restrict credit in harmful ways “obviously struck a chord with 
those who decried ‘red lining’”). 
 130. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (stating that a creditor’s claim will be disallowed to the 
extent that “such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under 
any . . . applicable law”); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 
161 (1946) (“What claims of creditors are valid and subsisting obligations against the 
bankrupt at the time a petition in bankruptcy is filed is a question which, in the absence of 
overruling federal law, is to be determined by reference to state law.”). 
 131. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). 
 132. Vern Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension:  A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 
27 ME. L. REV. 1 (1975).  More recently, in response to today’s credit crisis, John Pottow has 
suggested that courts recognize a cause of action for “reckless lending.” Pottow, supra note 
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state courts have found ways to deny abusive home mortgage creditors 
foreclosure relief.133
In only two sections does the Code punish objectionable creditor 
behavior in the transaction creating the claim against the debtor.  The first, 
§ 522(f), is very narrow.  Applicable only in consumer bankruptcy cases, 
this section allows an individual debtor to avoid a security interest if it is a 
non-possessory, non-purchase money security interest in exempt household 
goods, tools of the debtor’s trade, or professionally prescribed health 
aids.
  In the absence of non-bankruptcy law punishing 
abusive creditors, however, those creditors will be treated like all others in 
bankruptcy.  If they are home mortgage creditors, they will receive 
favorable bankruptcy treatment. 
134  The second, § 510(c), is the equitable subordination provision, 
which appears to be narrow because it has been used primarily to 
subordinate the claims of a debtor’s corporate insiders.135
Section 522(f) is a unique section in the Code in that it explicitly 
punishes lending practices that are considered predatory.  This section was 
designed to deter the practice of taking low value personal items as 
collateral for a loan other than a loan that enabled the debtor to purchase 
those items.  A creditor who takes household furniture and other household 
items as collateral for a loan is likely doing so not because such items have 






  Unsecured creditors enforcing judgment liens cannot reach these 
, at 420.  Pottow analogizes creditors who extend credit knowing that the debtor will not 
be able to pay to debtors who accumulate credit card debt by purchasing luxury goods 
immediately before bankruptcy. Id.  Creditors who would be punished under Pottow’s 
proposal are those who “know, or are reckless to the likelihood, that the debtor has no 
realistic prospect of repaying his loan within a reasonable period of time.” Id. at 463.  Alan 
White has urged an outright ban on subprime lending. White, supra note 49. 
 133. In Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, a New York court cancelled the mortgage 
indebtedness owing to a creditor who had acted abusively after the debtor’s default by not 
pursuing loan modification in good faith. 890 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 2009).  The court 
described the mortgage at issue as “‘sub-prime’ or ‘high cost’ in nature.” Id. at 315.  The 
same judge barred another subprime mortgage creditor from collecting interest on the loan 
after the date of default as well as legal fees and expenses because of its lack of good faith in 
its post-default modification negotiations. Emigrant Mortg. Co. v. Corcione, 900 N.Y.S.2d 
608 (Sup. Ct. 2010).  In addition, the Massachusetts Attorney General has successfully 
brought enforcement actions under state consumer protection law to force subprime lenders 
to work with the Attorney General’s office to restructure certain subprime loans before 
pursuing foreclosure. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 
(Mass. 2008). 
 134. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f). 
 135. Id. § 510(c). 
 136. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 30, at 194–95 (explaining that § 522(f) “was 
adopted largely in response to a growing concern about the use of security interests by 
certain finance companies to prey on the poor” and that the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) promulgated its rule to “limit any special incentive to file bankruptcy”).  Today, non-
purchase money loans secured by household goods are rare because after Congress enacted 
§ 522(f) as part of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, the FTC promulgated a rule under which a 
non-possessory, non-purchase money loan secured by certain personal items is considered an 
unfair trade practice. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2 (2010).  The FTC rule is 
based on § 522(f). See Lawrence Ponoroff, Exemption Impairing Liens Under Bankruptcy 
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low value household items in many states because of state exemption 
laws.137  Exemption laws, however, do not affect the rights of secured 
creditors.138  The avoidance provision in § 522(f) therefore preserves the 
debtor’s “fresh start” by allowing her to keep property that would be 
exempt but for the debtor’s grant of a security interest in an undesirable 
lending transaction.  One author has suggested extending this protection to 
debtors harmed by abusive home mortgage practices by allowing such 
debtors to avoid a subprime mortgage lien.139
By authorizing a court to subordinate all or part of an allowed claim to 
another allowed claim using “principles of equitable subordination,” 
§ 510(c) of the Code permits courts to deny relief to creditors who are not 
honest but unfortunate.
 
140  A court thus has the ability to punish a creditor 
for morally objectionable pre-bankruptcy behavior.  While the practical 
result of equitable subordination is often nonpayment of the subordinated 
claim, legally the claim is allowed, but pushed to the end of the distribution 
line.141  The most common use of this power is to subordinate claims of 
corporate insiders,142 but nowhere is the power limited to insider claims.  
Therefore, equitable subordination may be appropriate when the creditor’s 
claim is enforceable under non-bankruptcy law but the creditor’s conduct 
begs an equitable remedy.143
Because home mortgage creditors come to bankruptcy court seeking a 
favor, bankruptcy law can and should intervene to determine whether the 
home mortgage creditor is worthy of its special bankruptcy remedy.
 
144
A court using its equitable subordination power could strip down home 
mortgages so that the lender’s allowed secured claim would be equal to the 
  The 
home mortgage creditor is given a “super-priority” in that its entire claim, 
supported by collateral or not, is treated as secured, and thus entitled to full 
payment, and its original loan terms are enforced.  This super-priority may 
originally have been granted based on the worthiness of home mortgage 
lenders, but today’s lending practices have introduced some particularly 
unworthy creditors. 
 
Code Section 522(f):  One Step Forward and One Step Back, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 8 n.32 
(1999). 
 137. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 815.18 (West 2007). 
 138. See, e.g., id. §§ 815.18(2)(h), (12). 
 139. See generally Painter, supra note 64. 
 140. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c). 
 141. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, ¶ 510.05. 
 142. David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and Equitable 
Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 199 (2003); see also Woods v. City Nat’l Bank 
& Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269–70 (1941) (denying compensation to a mortgage 
bondholders’ committee under the Bankruptcy Act because of undisclosed conflicts of 
interest involving committee members who were employees of one of the underwriters of the 
bonds who in turn had an equity interest in the mortgaged property); Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295, 303–09 (1939) (subordinating salary claims of a corporate officer that were not 
enforced until the company was in financial difficulty). 
 143. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 22, ¶ 510.02. 
 144. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 869 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (explaining 
that “equitable scrutiny attaches” when a creditor asks for “affirmative aid of the bankruptcy 
court to secure its preferred position in the bankruptcy”). 
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market value of the home.  The lender would then be entitled to an 
unsecured claim in the amount by which the outstanding loan exceeds the 
value of the home.  A court using this power could also reduce the interest 
rate on the loan.  In the remainder of this Article, I explain equitable 
subordination in detail and discuss why it is well suited to remedying the 
harms caused by creative lending practices. 
III.  EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION 
A. A Brief History of Equitable Subordination in Bankruptcy 
The courts’ power to equitably subordinate claims was made explicit 
when Congress passed the Code in 1978.  Congress intended, in including 
an equitable subordination provision in the Code, that courts would both 
rely on pre-existing case law and continue to develop standards for 
equitable subordination.145
The Code’s predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act) contained 
no specific equitable subordination provision.  Because the Act contained 
no specific equitable subordination provision, courts deciding cases under 
the Act found their power to subordinate claims in the Act’s grant to courts 
of “such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise 
original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings.”
  The recent proliferation of abusive lending 
practices that are currently protected by the Code’s anti-modification 
provision gives bankruptcy courts an ideal opportunity to identify and 
remedy inequitable conduct in home mortgage lending transactions. 
146  This grant led many 
courts to describe bankruptcy courts as courts of equity.147  Broadly, courts 
interpreted the Act as requiring them to use the rules and principles of 
equity jurisprudence in adjudicating the rights of the parties involved in a 
bankruptcy case.148  Historically, the equity system treated access to its 
remedies as a privilege, not a right.149
 
 145. See Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators), 926 F.2d 
1458, 1464 (5th Cir. 1991); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
  This equitable principle is clear in 
the discharge provisions of the Code, which grant relief only to well-
behaved debtors.  Another hallmark of equity is that it is “flexible rather 
22, ¶ 510.05 (citing to 
legislative history); Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable 
Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 BUS. LAW. 417, 421 (1985). 
 146. Pepper, 308 U.S at 304 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934)). 
 147. See, e.g., Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946) (stating that “[i]t is true that 
a bankruptcy court is also a court of equity”); Pepper, 308 U.S. at 304 (noting the Act’s 
grant of equity jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts); Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 240 (“Courts of 
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in 
equity.”); Larson v. First State Bank of Vienna, S.D., (In re Eggen) 21 F.2d 936, 938 (8th 
Cir. 1927) (stating that “[a] court of bankruptcy is a court of equity”). But see Alan M. 
Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Judge:  A Statutory Court, Not 
a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 11 (2005) (explaining that while bankruptcy courts 
are not courts of equity, bankruptcy judges have specific equitable powers conferred by 
statute); Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”:  What Does That 
Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275, 310 (1999) (discussing the history of equity and bankruptcy and 
concluding that bankruptcy courts are not courts of equity). 
 148. Larson, 21 F.2d at 938. 
 149. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 57 (Practitioner Treatise Series 2d ed. 1993). 
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than rigid, its interest justice rather than law.”150
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Pepper v. Litton
  Courts that equitably 
subordinate claims apply these equitable principles to creditor behavior. 
151 provides the classic 
example of an individual claim subordinated because of creditor 
misconduct.  In that case, a corporate insider, described as the “dominant 
and controlling stockholder” of the debtor corporation, had caused the 
corporation to confess a judgment on salary claims due to him while 
another creditor’s lawsuit was pending.152  In subordinating the insider’s 
claim to the claims of the general unsecured creditors, the Court construed 
the Act’s grant of equity jurisdiction to allow it to “sift the circumstances 
surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in 
administration of the bankrupt estate.”153
While creditor misconduct is a necessary element of an equitable 
subordination claim, the injustice or unfairness required by Pepper is 
unfairness in the distribution results, not unfairness to the debtor.  Courts 
find unjust or unfair results when the conduct of one creditor negatively 
affects the claim position of another creditor.
 
154  A good example of this is 
found in Miller v. Borton (In re Bowman Hardware & Electric Co.),155 in 
which a non-insider creditor, Miller, insisted that the debtor keep the loan 
arrangement between them secret.  A second creditor, Van Camp, made a 
loan to the debtor, relying on the debtor’s false statements about its 
financial condition.156  The court found that because Miller induced the 
debtor’s misstatements, Miller’s claim should be subordinated to the claim 
of Van Camp.157  In subordinating the claim, the court cited the general rule 
of equity that “he who has done iniquity shall not have equity,”158 and 
listed three categories of acts that could deprive a creditor of equal 
treatment:  those involving moral turpitude, those involving breach of duty, 
and misrepresentations that deceive other creditors to their detriment.159
Courts view their ability to equitably subordinate claims as primarily 
remedial, not punitive.  Only a creditor or the trustee, but not the debtor, has 




 150. Id. at 63. 
  Equitable 
subordination gives a court the power to remedy injustices that would result 
 151. 308 U.S. 295 (1939). 
 152. Id. at 296–97. 
 153. Id. at 307–08; see also Bostian v. Schapiro (In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co.), 144 
F.2d 791, 800 (8th Cir. 1944) (describing equitable subordination as “an exercise of the 
court’s general power under the statute to adjust equities among creditors in relation to the 
liquidation results”). 
 154. Bostian, 144 F.2d at 800. 
 155. 67 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1933). 
 156. Id. at 795. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 794. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Balcor/Morristown P’ship v. Vector Whippany Assocs., 181 B.R. 781, 791 (D.N.J. 
1995); Weeks v. Kinslow (In re Weeks), 28 B.R. 958, 960 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1983). 
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from allowing a claim to its full extent with its statutory priority.161  In one 
early case, the court described its equitable subordination power as the 
authority to “go no farther than to level off actual inequitable disparities on 
the bankruptcy terrain for which a creditor is responsible.”162  The end 
result of equitable subordination is not recovery for wrongdoing, but rather 
removal of any disadvantage in claim positions caused by a creditor’s 
conduct.163  Although the creditor must have acted in an objectionable way 
to have its claim subordinated, the objectionable behavior is punished for its 
effect on other creditors, not its effect on the debtor.  This reflects the policy 
goal of equitable distribution, and when courts find that the distribution 
mandated by the Code’s priority provisions will be unfair to some creditors, 
they use their equitable powers to subordinate claims of creditors who acted 
badly “to the ethically superior claims asserted by other creditors.”164
Courts have recognized several important limitations on their equitable 
powers.  Pre-Code courts recognized that their equitable powers were not 
plenary but instead confined to the powers granted to the court by the Act, 
such as the allowance and disallowance of claims and the collection and 
distribution of the bankruptcy estate.
 
165  The equitable subordination cases 
refine this limitation, drawing a clear line between denying individual 
claims their statutory priority because of creditor misconduct, and 
subordinating entire classes of claims based on a general distaste for the 
class of claims at issue.166
It is important to stress the limits on a court’s power to reorder priorities.  
The Act, like the Code, established a hierarchy of priority claims.
 
167  
Principles of equity did not allow a court to ignore that mandate by 
subordinating an entire class of claims to another in clear contravention of 
the Act.  For example, under the Act, there was only one class of 
administrative expenses, and all such expenses were treated equally whether 
they were incurred during an attempted reorganization or during the 
subsequent liquidation after the reorganization attempt failed.168  In United 
States v. Killoren,169 the court thus rejected the trustee’s request to 
subordinate reorganization period taxes to liquidation period administrative 
expenses because the classification of claims is a job for Congress, not the 
courts.170
This prohibition on the wholesale reordering of priorities by courts 
remains an important limitation on the equitable subordination power.  The 
 
 
 161. Asa S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L. REV. 83, 113 (1961). 
 162. Bostian, 144 F.2d at 801. 
 163. Id.; In re Automatic Washer Co., 226 F. Supp. 834, 836 (S.D. Iowa 1964). 
 164. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel), 563 F.2d 692, 699 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 165. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939). 
 166. United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540–41 (1996); United States v. Killoren, 
119 F.2d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1941). 
 167. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 64, 30 Stat. 544. 
 168. Killoren, 119 F.2d at 366.  Today, the Code grants a higher priority to liquidation 
period administrative expenses. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (2006). 
 169. 119 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1941). 
 170. Id. at 366. 
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Supreme Court addressed this issue under the Code in United States v. 
Noland.171  In that case, the bankruptcy court had subordinated the 
government’s claim for a post-petition non-compensatory tax penalty to 
claims of the unsecured creditors, not because of any inequitable conduct by 
the government, but because of “the Code’s preference for compensating 
actual loss claims.”172  Because subordination in such a case “runs directly 
counter to Congress’s policy judgment that a post-petition tax penalty 
should receive the priority of an administrative expense,” the Supreme 
Court refused subordination.173
A concise statement of the equitable principles relied on by courts in 
equitably subordinating claims can be found in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel 
Co.).
 
174  In this opinion, the court combined many of the equitable 
principles announced by the pre-Code courts into the most commonly used 
test for equitable subordination.  Under the Mobile Steel test, three 
conditions must be satisfied before the court can equitably subordinate a 
claim:  the claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable 
conduct, the misconduct must have resulted in injury to the debtor’s 
creditors or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant, and equitable 
subordination must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the 
bankruptcy statute.175  The creditor’s conduct must be somehow culpable; it 
is not sufficient that the result of a creditor’s actions proves inequitable.176  
In addition, a claim should be subordinated “only to the extent necessary to 
offset the harm which the bankrupt and its creditors suffered on account of 
the inequitable conduct.”177
B.  The (Perhaps False) Distinction Between Insider and Non-Insider 
Equitable Subordination Cases 
  While this test does not distinguish between 
insider and non-insider creditors, courts have had the opportunity to apply it 
more frequently in insider cases.  As I discuss below, non-insider claims 
can be subordinated under Mobile Steel, and the test should be used to 
subordinate the claims of home mortgage lenders that engaged in abusive 
lending practices. 
Equitable subordination cases appear to fall into two broad categories:  
cases involving claims held by corporate insiders and those involving 
claims held by other creditors.  Most successful equitable subordination 
actions have involved the claims of insider creditors.  This abundance of 
precedent has led courts and commentators to draw a clear line between 
 
 171. 517 U.S. 535 (1996). 
 172. In re First Truck Lines, Inc., 141 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d sub 
nom. I.R.S. v. Noland, 190 B.R. 827 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aff’d sub nom. United States v. 
Noland (In re First Truck Lines), 48 F.3d 210 (6th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 517 U.S. 535 (1996). 
 173. Noland, 517 U.S. at 541. 
 174. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 175. Id. at 699–700. 
 176. Noland, 517 U.S. at 539. 
 177. In re Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 701. 
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insider cases and non-insider cases.178  At first blush the distinction appears 
to be significant, with courts in the non-insider claim cases stressing that the 
misconduct necessary in those cases must be “more egregious” in order for 
such claims to be subordinated.179
1.  The Insider Cases 
  A review of equitable subordination 
opinions, however, shows that the distinction between insider cases and 
non-insider cases is less significant than it first appears. 
Many equitable subordination cases involve corporate insiders.  An 
officer, director, or controlling stockholder of a corporation is a fiduciary 
who must come to the bankruptcy court with clean hands in presenting a 
claim.180  Under corporate law, an insider’s dealings with a corporation 
must be undertaken in good faith and must be inherently fair to the 
corporation.181  In determining fairness, a court must determine whether the 
transaction carries “the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.”182  This 
search for fairness extends to courts in bankruptcy cases, which have the 
power to “sift the circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice 
or unfairness is not done in administration of the bankrupt estate.”183
The insider’s position in the corporation gives that person many 
opportunities to engage in conduct that a court might find inequitable.  The 
misconduct that led to subordination in Pepper v. Litton was a typical 
misuse of an insider’s fiduciary status to elevate his position in the 




 178. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 343 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Equitable 
subordination typically involves closely-held corporations and their insiders.”); Wilson v. 
Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am.), 818 F.2d 1135, 1144 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(“This case is unlike most equitable subordination cases in that the claimant . . . is not the 
officer/director/controlling shareholder of a debtor . . . .”); Waslow v. MNC Commercial 
Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that 
“[e]quitable subordination has seldom been invoked, much less successfully so, in cases 
involving non-insiders and/or non-fiduciaries”); 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. 
Bank, 169 B.R. 832, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining that “[t]raditionally, equitable 
subordination did not apply to ordinary creditors”); DeNatale & Abram, supra note 
  
Because the Court was dealing with fiduciary misconduct, it gave several 
145, at 
424 (arguing that in defining the offending creditor conduct, “the relationship of the creditor 
to the debtor is an essential factor”); Timothy A. French, The Rise and Fall of the Doctrine 
of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 
257, 257 (1995) (claiming that equitable subordination was originally developed by the 
courts “as a means of reclassifying or subordinating claims held by corporate insiders”). 
 179. See, e.g., Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 
471 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that gross and egregious conduct is required 
before the court will equitably subordinate a non-insider, non-fiduciary claim); Estes v. 
N&D Props., Inc. (In re N&D Props., Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 731 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining 
that “[i]f the claimant is not an insider or fiduciary . . . the trustee must prove more egregious 
conduct such as fraud, spoliation or overreaching”). 
 180. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 101. 
 181. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS § 10.01 
(2d ed. 2003). 
 182. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306–07 (1939). 
 183. Id. at 308 (emphasis added). 
 184. See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text. 
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examples of categories of fiduciary behavior that could lead to 
subordination of that fiduciary’s claim, most of which involved the 
fiduciary using his position to prefer himself to the disadvantage of the 
persons to whom his duties run.185  The Court explained why claims of 
corporate insiders could be subject to equitable subordination, focusing on 
the importance of fiduciary duties.  The Court in Pepper did not limit 
courts’ equitable subordination power to claims of corporate insiders, but 
said that a court’s duty to scrutinize claims was “especially clear” in such 
cases.186
A court’s power to equitably subordinate insider claims is especially 
clear because of the ability that an insider has to manipulate the affairs of a 




There is no precise definition of the inequitable conduct required to 
satisfy the first prong of the Mobile Steel test for equitable subordination.  
Because most equitable subordination cases have dealt with insider claims, 
the required conduct has been defined with reference to insider behavior.  
Courts faced with challenges to insider claims have thus developed lists of 
behavior that they consider inequitable.  For instance, in Mobile Steel the 
court focused on initial undercapitalization,
  As a result, in an insider case, the courts have a ready set of 
rules on which to rely:  if the corporate insider has breached a fiduciary 
duty owed under state law, that insider’s claim can be subordinated under 
bankruptcy law.  The insider is, in effect, not “honest but unfortunate;” she 
has taken advantage of her insider position pre-bankruptcy to the detriment 
of the corporation’s creditors in bankruptcy. 
188 mismanagement, breach of 
fiduciary duties and abuse of fiduciary position.189  These categories were 
specific to the claims being challenged, which arose from loans to the 
debtor corporation by insiders and the purchase by the debtor of real 
property from insiders.190
 
 185. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 311 (“He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve 
himself first and his cestuis second.”). 
 
 186. Id. at 308. 
 187. Id. at 311. 
 188. Although Mobile Steel lists undercapitalization as an example of inequitable 
behavior, courts almost uniformly hold that undercapitalization must be combined with other 
questionable conduct in order for the court to subordinate a claim resulting from an insider’s 
transaction with an undercapitalized corporation. See, e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 
F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that undercapitalization does not, on its own, justify 
equitable subordination); Mach. Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 
709, 717 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that undercapitalization can tip the equities toward 
subordination); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) 
(holding that initial undercapitalization, without additional inequitable conduct, is “not a 
sufficient basis for the equitable subordination of a claim”). But see Herby’s Foods, Inc. v. 
Summit Coffee Co. (In re Herby’s Foods, Inc.), 134 B.R. 207, 211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991) 
(stating that undercapitalization “constitutes a form of inequitable conduct”).  
Undercapitalization was described by two commentators as a “bedfellow” of other insider 
misconduct. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 94. 
 189. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 702–05 (5th Cir. 
1977). 
 190. Id. at 695–98. 
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Courts applying Mobile Steel have expanded this list of inequitable 
conduct to include fraud, illegality, and the claimant’s use of the debtor as 
an alter ego or mere instrumentality.191
A corporate insider’s access to information about the corporation and 
ability to control corporate affairs gives her ample opportunity to engage in 
the inequitable conduct supporting subordination.  For example, an insider 
has the ability to mislead lenders about her company’s financial health by 
disguising pre-existing loans.  If the outside lender would have no way of 
learning of that disguised debt, the insider’s claim will be subordinated to 
the claim of the outside lender.
  This list is not necessarily 
exclusive, and illustrates the scenarios in which courts have equitably 
subordinated claims.  Again, this list includes the types of bad behavior 
engaged in by corporate insiders. 
192  Likewise, courts have subordinated 
insider claims when the insider induced other creditors to abstain from 
collecting on past debts.193  An insider’s knowledge and control of a 
corporation’s finances also gives him the opportunity to enrich himself and 
other insiders at the expense of the outside creditors.  Courts also find this 
type of behavior to satisfy the inequitable conduct prong of Mobile Steel 
and have subordinated insider claims when the insider caused the 
corporation to redeem the shares of another insider when the corporation 
was in a shaky financial condition.194
Insider status, however, is not a sufficient basis for subordination.  The 
insider relationship simply gives an individual numerous opportunities to 
engage in fraud and other improper conduct.
 
195  Insider status, therefore, is 
not a factor in a successful equitable subordination claim, as such status 
must always be combined with inequitable conduct.  In an insider case it is 
relatively easy to find some inequitable conduct justifying subordination of 
claims because the questionable conduct by the claimant often involves 
some breach of a fiduciary duty.196
In equitably subordinating claims of insiders who breached fiduciary 
duties, courts recognized that the insiders did not come to court as honest 
but unfortunate creditors.  In these cases, creditors who used their inside 
position to attempt to gain an advantage over other creditors found their 
claims subordinated to those of other creditors. 
  Breach of fiduciary duty, however, is 
just one form of inequitable conduct. 
 
 191. In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d at 344–45; Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical 
Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. 
Huffman (In re Missionary Baptist Found. of Am.), 712 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 192. See In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d at 346. 
 193. See Fabricators, 926 F.2d at 1467. 
 194. Mach. Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiponics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709, 720 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
 195. Fabricators, 926 F.2d at 1465; George Ashe, Subordination of Claims:  Equitable 
Principles Applied in Bankruptcy, 72 COM. L.J. 91, 92 (1967). 
 196. Corporate officers and directors have well-established fiduciary duties, including the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 181, § 10.01, at 476 
(“[D]irectors owe a three-fold duty to the corporation . . . . they must be obedient . . . . they 
must be diligent . . . . they must be loyal.” (citations omitted)). 
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2.  The Non-Insider Cases 
Although Pepper v. Litton is cited as the classic equitable subordination 
case,197 the courts in pre-Code cases recognized that their power to 
equitably subordinate claims was not limited to the claims of corporate 
insiders.  Most of the cases in which courts subordinated claims involved 
breaches of fiduciary duties, but the courts did not, in defining the 
parameters of their equitable subordination power, limit that power to the 
subordination of insider claims.  For example, one court gave a non-
exclusive list of the uses of equitable subordination, which included “to 
nullify the effect of any fraud that a creditor has committed.”198
When the claim sought to be subordinated is held by a non-insider, 
inequitable conduct is often defined in terms of what it is not.  This lack of 
definition stands in stark contrast to the list of inequitable conduct 
developed by courts in insider cases.  Part of the reason for this may be the 
context in which several of the unsuccessful equitable subordination cases 
arose.  Many of the lender liability cases of the 1990s involved claims of 
overreaching by creditors after default.
 
199  Courts in cases involving arm’s-
length loans to businesses tended to stress that in order for a lender’s claim 
to be subordinated using the principle of equitable subordination, the lender 
must do something other than act in the way that lenders traditionally 
act.200  Because the average lender owes no fiduciary duty to the debtor or 
its creditors, defining the level of inequitable conduct necessary to 
subordinate a non-insider claim is difficult.201  In a recent case, Henry v. 
Lehman Commercial Paper (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.),202 the 
court held that the claimant’s conduct was not inequitable because it did not 
contribute to bringing about the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, nor did it 
determine the ordering of creditors in the bankruptcy estate.203
Some of these lender liability cases involved lenders who terminated 
lines of credit knowing that the debtor would be unable to pay the loan in 
full, thus hastening the demise of the debtor’s business.  The loan 




 197. See Carlson, supra note 
 
142, at 198 (describing Pepper v. Litton as the case that 
invented equitable subordination); Harry S. Gleick, Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy 
Under the Equitable Power of the Bankruptcy Court, 16 BUS. LAW. 611, 614 (1961) 
(describing Pepper v. Litton as the best known of all equitable subordination cases). 
 198. Bostian v. Schapiro (In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co.), 144 F.2d 791, 800 (8th 
Cir. 1944). 
 199. See, e.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc., v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 
(7th Cir. 1990); Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella & Sons, Inc.), 161 
B.R. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 200. See Kham & Nate’s Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1358 (“Bank did not create Debtor’s need for 
funds, and it was not contractually obliged to satisfy its customer’s desires.”); In re Paolella, 
161 B.R. at 120 (finding that the bank “acted within its contractual rights in monitoring the 
debtor’s operations and in ceasing to advance funds because the loan was out of formula”). 
 201. 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank (In re 80 Nassau Assoc.), 169 B.R. 
832, 839 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
 202. 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 203. Id. at 1007. 
 204. 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990). 
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is typical of the type of transaction for which an equitable subordination 
argument fails.  The lender in that case had provided both pre-petition and 
post-petition financing to the debtor company.  About two months after the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing, the lender stated that it would cease advancing 
funds to the debtor.  The contract between the two provided for cancellation 
of the credit line on five days notice to the debtor.205  The Bankruptcy 
Court subordinated the creditor’s claim, finding that the creditor was “fully 
aware of the Debtor’s plight, and its reliance upon the line of credit, and 
disregarded the consequences for the Debtor and its creditors,”206 but the 
Seventh Circuit reversed, citing the need to enforce contracts according to 
their terms.207  In the bad faith cases such as Kham & Nate’s, courts 
rejected the argument that lenders, by enforcing their loan terms to the 
letter, violate some standard of fairness or decency toward their 
borrowers.208
Courts faced with an equitable subordination attack on a non-insider 
claim purport to hold the claimant to a higher standard of misconduct than 
that required of those objecting to insider claims.  Courts have held that 
plaintiffs must show that the arm’s length creditor’s conduct was “gross or 
egregious,” and that the plaintiff must prove gross misconduct tantamount 
to “fraud, overreaching or spoliation.”
 
209  One court however has 
recognized that, despite the claims of courts to the contrary, there is no 
different standard by which to judge non-insider conduct, but rather the 
traditional grounds, based on fiduciary duties, are not available when the 
claim sought to be subordinated is held by a non-insider.210
From the opinions granting equitable subordination of a non-insider 
claim, one can draw the conclusion that conduct that is harmful to the other 
creditors will be considered inequitable if that conduct veers from normal 
lending practices.  The opinion in Bank of New Richmond v. Production 
 
 
 205. Id. at 1353–54. 
 206. Id. at 1356. 
 207. Id. at 1357. 
 208. Id. at 1357–58; Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc. v. Assocs. Commercial Corp. (In re 
Clark Pipe and Supply Co.), 893 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that “[t]hrough 
its loan agreement, every lender effectively exercises ‘control’ over its borrower to some 
degree” and that the purpose of equitable subordination is to “distinguish between the 
unilateral remedies that a creditor may properly enforce pursuant to its agreements with the 
debtor and other inequitable conduct such as fraud, misrepresentation, or the exercise of . . . 
total control over the debtor”); Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella & 
Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (denying equitable subordination when faced 
with a lender who exercised enhanced monitoring rights over its borrower pursuant to the 
terms of its loan agreement); Speth v. Whitham Farms Feedyard, L.P. (In re Sunbelt Grain 
WKS, LLC), 406 B.R. 918, 934 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009) (“Indeed, the record suggests nothing 
more than [the creditor’s] apparent exercise of its rights under the loan documents . . . .”); 
Overby, supra note 113, at 1014. 
 209. In re Paolella, 161 B.R. at 119; see also Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. 
(In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 471 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that gross and 
egregious conduct on the part of the outside claimant is necessary for equitable 
subordination). 
 210. 80 Nassau Assocs. v. Crossland Fed. Sav. Bank. (In re 80 Nassau Assocs.), 169 B.R. 
832, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
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Credit Ass’n (In re Osborne)211 nicely illustrates the distinction between 
normal and unusual lending practices.  The complaining creditors in 
Osborne urged the court to subordinate the claim of the Production Credit 
Association (PCA) for two reasons:  the PCA controlled the debtor’s 
business and the PCA misrepresented the degree of support that it would 
give to the debtors.212  To prove control, the complaining creditors (who 
supplied farm supplies to the debtor) showed that the PCA gave the debtor 
instructions on how to spend the loan funds.213  The court found, however, 
that this is not the type of control required under the various equitable 
subordination tests; it was control that arose out of the PCA’s status as a 
creditor with a security interest in most of the debtor’s assets.214  Because 
the court found no control, the court required the other creditors to show 
“gross misconduct.”215
The plaintiff’s use of “control” as an example of inequitable conduct is a 
good example of a plaintiff straining to fit non-insider conduct into one of 
the fiduciary misconduct categories.  Control, even if found, is relevant 
only to the extent that it allows the claimant to engage in inequitable 
conduct.  Because the PCA in Osborne was making payments directly to 
some of Osborne’s creditors on Osborne’s account, it had such an 
opportunity because it was in regular contact with some of the other 
creditors.  The PCA assured one of the complaining creditors that the 
creditor would be paid even though the PCA knew of the debtor’s dire 
financial condition and that it would be terminating support for the 
debtor.
 
216  The court thus found the requisite level of inequitable conduct, 
because the PCA had superior knowledge regarding the debtor’s financial 
condition and used that knowledge to induce the creditor to continue 
supplying feed to the debtor.217
Even inside information allowing a creditor to gain an advantage over 
other creditors is not necessary if that creditor’s actions improperly allow it 
to gain priority over the debtor’s other creditors.  The subordinated claimant 
in First National Bank of Gatlinburg v. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. (In re 
Just for the Fun of It of Tennessee, Inc.)
  Compared to the other creditors, the PCA 
was less “honest but unfortunate” and therefore found its claims 
subordinated to those of the creditors who relied on its misstatements. 
218
 
 211. 42 B.R. 988 (W.D. Wis. 1984). 
 was one of many contractors on 
an amusement park project.  That creditor, Botkin, filed a notice of 
completion in the public record as general contractor for the project.  Once 
the notice was filed, other contractors had a short period of time within 
which to file any lien notices.  Because Botkin misrepresented both that he 
was the general contractor and that the project was complete, the court 
subordinated his claim to those of the creditors who were deceived to their 
 212. Id. at 989. 
 213. Id. at 990. 
 214. Id. at 997. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 999–1000. 
 217. Id. 
 218. 7 B.R. 166 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). 
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detriment by the false notice.219
Courts have been open to arguments that the non-insider’s conduct at the 
outset of the lending relationship might be inequitable if the loan is unusual 
enough.  The facts in Nicholson v. Core (In re Carolee’s Combine, Inc.)
  Again, the subordinated creditor was 
deemed “dishonest” and undeserving of its statutory priority. 
220 
could be said to illustrate a creative lending practice.  Carolee’s Combine 
was organized to conduct an auction of architectural antiques.  Because of 
the high cost of acquiring and refurbishing the goods to be sold and the 
difficulty of raising funds through conventional means, the principals of the 
company embarked on what the bankruptcy court described as “an 
inventive money raising scheme.”221  To attract investors in the auction 
company, the principals promised investors that their money would be 
returned on the first day of the auction with ten percent annual interest.  In 
addition, those investors would receive at the same time a “finder’s fee” 
equal to ten percent of their investment.  The auction company’s obligation 
to each investor was evidenced by two documents:  a promissory note and a 
“Finder’s Fee Letter.”222  In subordinating the investors’ claims to the 
claims of the debtor’s trade and other creditors, the court stressed that the 
investors “advanced monies to a speculative venture for the promise of a 
high return,” and while that in itself is not inequitable, the court added that 
the investors “shifted the risk of that speculation to general creditors by 
arranging to be paid in advance.”223
Courts have also discussed whether a lender whose loan agreement 
contains onerous terms has engaged in inequitable conduct warranting 
subordination.  The opinion in In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co.
 
224 
supports the argument that equitable subordination might be used to combat 
abusive lending practices.  The questioned loans in In re Elkins-Dell were 
business loans that carried high rates of interest and gave the creditors a 
great deal of control over the debtor’s finances.  One lender, Fidelity, 
required that the debtor finance only through it and through no other 
lenders.225  Fidelity also reserved the power to unilaterally change the terms 
of the loan agreement by giving notice of the changes by certified mail.  
The trustee, in seeking equitable disallowance of Fidelity’s claim, argued 
that the loan contract was unconscionable.226
 
 219. Id. at 180–81. 
 
 220. 3 B.R. 324 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). 
 221. Id. at 326. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 328. 
 224. 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
 225. Id. at 866. 
 226. Id. at 866–67.  Because there was no specific equitable subordination provision in 
the Act, courts applied the same standards to both equitably subordinate and equitably 
disallow claims. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308–09 (1939) (explaining that the 
“Deep Rock” doctrine, as set forth in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 
(1939), allows claims of corporate insiders to be disallowed or subordinated when courts 
“are satisfied that allowance of the claims would not be fair or equitable to other creditors”). 
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The court declined to disallow Fidelity’s claim, remanding for further 
development of the factual record on unconscionability.227  Nevertheless, 
the opinion contains some useful guidance on whether abusive loan terms 
could ever result in subordination of a lender’s claim.  First, the court 
explained that federal law could govern unconscionability in determining 
whether a claim could be allowed because a bankruptcy claimant “ask[s] a 
favor” of the bankruptcy court.228  The court also noted that while it was 
reluctant to deny enforcement of a loan contract between two businesses 
like the one before it, it might not be as reluctant to deny enforcement of a 
consumer loan contract.229  Last, the court cautioned that regulation of 
oppressive loan products was the job of the legislature, not the judiciary,230 
but suggested that it might be inclined to disallow a lender’s claim if the 
loan terms bore no reasonable relationship to business risks.231
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana recently equitably 
subordinated a non-insider claim in an opinion that seems to require that 
creditors be “honest but unfortunate” in order to obtain the relief given to 
creditors in bankruptcy.  Tim Blixseth, the principal of the borrower in 
Credit Suisse v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re 
Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC)
 
232 does not elicit much sympathy.  One 
can assume that he is a sophisticated businessperson; he developed “the 
world’s only private ski and golf community.”233  Credit Suisse contacted 
Blixseth to offer him a new loan product, a syndicated term loan, which 
Credit  Suisse analogized to a home-equity loan.234  This new loan product 
enabled Credit Suisse to offer larger loans to borrowers than it had been 
previously able to offer.235
Although it seems that Blixseth’s conduct, not Credit Suisse’s conduct, 
precipitated the Yellowstone Mountain Club’s bankruptcy filing,
 
236 the 
opinion contains some reasoning that could be useful to courts in 
refashioning equitable subordination to punish creative lending practices.  
In subordinating Credit Suisse’s claim, the court described Credit Suisse’s 
“naked greed” combined with its “complete disregard for the Debtors or 
any other person or entity who was subordinated to Credit Suisse’s first lien 
position” as conduct that shocked the conscience of the court.237
 
 227. In re Elkins-Dell, 253 F. Supp. at 875. 
 
 228. Id. at 869. 
 229. Id. at 871. 
 230. Id. at 872. 
 231. Id. at 873. 
 232. No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2047 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
May 12, 2009). 
 233. Id. at *7.  The New York Times described the Yellowstone Club’s bankruptcy filing 
as “one of the signature, fin de siècle moments of our passing Gilded Age.” Amy Wallace, 
Checkmate at the Yellowstone Club, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2009, at BU1. 
 234. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 2047, at *8–9. 
 235. Id. at *9. 
 236. The Credit Agreement provided that most of the loan proceeds could be used for 
purposes other than development of the Yellowstone Club, and Blixseth in fact used the 
funds for other purposes. Id. at *15–16 
 237. Id. at *31. 
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In deciding to subordinate the claim, the court relied on both the debtor’s 
questionable financial condition at the time the loan was made and the 
failure of Credit Suisse to perform adequate due diligence.  For example, 
Credit Suisse never requested audited financial statements from the debtors, 
relying instead on the debtors’ own historical and future projections.238  
Additionally, the court found that Credit Suisse was offering a new loan 
product and was driven by the fees it received for these loans.239
The opinion is couched in predatory lending language, a point made by 
many members of the legal community in criticizing the result.
 
240  While 
such language is almost unheard of in cases involving commercial loans, it 
could be useful in attacking some consumer lending practices.  The In re 
Yellowstone Mountain Club opinion was vacated after the parties reached a 
settlement,241
IV. WHY EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION IS A GOOD REMEDY FOR CREATIVE 
LENDING PRACTICES, DESPITE POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS 
 but it is particularly useful in that it defined inequitable 
conduct in terms of what it is rather than what it is not. 
Equitable subordination can be a useful tool in attacking abusive lending 
practices because it must be applied only on a case-by-case basis and not 
against all mortgage creditors who find that their collateral is worth less 
than the amount outstanding on their loans.  While granting special priority 
to home mortgage creditors seems like a bad policy in the wake of the 
mortgage crisis, it is up to Congress, not the courts, to remove that special 
priority.  Yet courts have the power to make exceptions to this special 
priority when justified by the facts of a particular home mortgage claim.242
 
 238. Id. at *11. 
  
The subordination approach would be an appropriate way of dealing with a 
home mortgage lender who engaged in abusive lending practices because, 
although such a lender is a creditor who is owed a legally enforceable 
 239. Id. at *31. 
 240. See, e.g., Jo Ann J. Brighton & Felton E. Parrish, Yellowstone:  New Standards for 
Lender Liability in Today’s Economic Climate, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2009, at 28; 
Hedge Funds and Bankruptcy:  Credit Suisse and Yellowstone are Big Boys, BULLIVANT, 
HOUSER, BAILEY P.C. (May 19, 2009), http://www.bullivant.com/Hedge-Funds-and-
Bankruptcy; Weathering the Storm:  Look Out Lenders—Collecting Fees for Loaning Money 
May Be Considered Evil, HAYNES AND BOONE’S NEWSROOM (June 12, 2009), 
http://www.haynesboone.com/weathering_the_storm_look_out_lenders/; In re Yellowstone 
Mountain Club, LLC—The Pitfalls of “Equitable Subordination” for the Unwary Lender, 
WHITE & CASE CLIENT ALERT (June 4, 2009), http://www.whitecase.com/
files/Publication/0e4b30ee-17f3-411b-bfff9b4df82f5a44/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/843ae7fa-ae7b-4c75-a666-a94df156335e/alert_In_re_Yellowstone_MountainClubLLC.pdf. 
 241. Jessica Katz, Secured Creditor’s Claim Equitably Subordinated by Bankruptcy 
Court, ABI COMMITTEE NEWS, SECURED CREDIT COMMITTEE, VOL. 6, NO. 1 (July 2009), 
available at http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/financebank/vol6num1/
secured.html. 
 242. See Merrimac Paper Co. v. Harrison (In re Merrimac Paper Co.), 420 F.3d 53, 61 
(1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[s]uch case-by-case adjudication is at the core of judicial 
competence”). 
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obligation, equity might require that a portion of that lender’s claim be 
treated as unsecured and that its loan terms be modified.243
A court should be able to both cram down the home mortgagee’s claim 
and modify its interest rate using equitable subordination.  Bifurcation of 
the undersecured mortgagee’s claim into a secured and an unsecured claim 
would recognize the true nature of many abusive loans.  Most subprime 
mortgage loans were used to refinance existing mortgage loans.  Borrowers 
were encouraged to use their homes like credit cards.
 
244
Yet the home mortgagee enjoys a special priority not only because it is 
treated as a fully-secured creditor regardless of the value of its collateral but 
also because it is entitled to enforce its original loan terms.  These loan 
terms often include a higher interest rate than that which a court would 
permit to be paid to other holders of secured claims in Chapter 13.
  By treating the 
portion of a home mortgage loan that exceeds the value of the home as 
unsecured, a court using equitable subordination would recognize that to the 
extent a home mortgage lender is in fact an unsecured creditor like a credit 
card issuer, it is also an unsecured creditor for priority purposes. 
245
A.  Abusive Lending and the Mobile Steel Test 
  A 
court exercising equitable subordination should thus also lower the interest 
rate payable on the home mortgage loan because only by doing so will the 
court deny the mortgagee its special priority and allow all creditors to be 
treated fairly in bankruptcy. 
In order for a court to equitably subordinate a claim, the claimant must 
have engaged in some inequitable conduct.  Congress intended that courts 
develop the concept of equitable subordination over time, and while it is 
said to be a rare and limited remedy,246
 
 243. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 
 the recent subprime mortgage crisis 
precipitated by abusive lending practices gives courts a unique opportunity 
to remedy the harm that was done by these practices and discourage the 
22, ¶ 510.01 (stating that § 510(c) 
“provides for the subordination of allowed claims, when principles of equity would be 
offended by the treatment of such claims as senior or on a parity with those of other 
creditors”); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 86 (arguing that subordination “should be 
ordered when the claimant is undeniably a creditor, but for reasons of equity should be 
relegated to a rank inferior to that of general creditors”). 
 244. See Adams, supra note 49, at 604 (explaining that changes to the Internal Revenue 
Code made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made the use of home equity for purposes other 
than home improvement more appealing); Dickerson, supra note 80, at 24–25 (explaining 
that most subprime loans were refinance loans and that most home equity lines of credit 
were used for purposes other than home improvement and suggesting a rebuttable 
presumption under which home equity and refinance loans would be treated as general 
unsecured loans unless they were used for housing purposes or to reduce overall debt); 
White, supra note 49, at 630 (explaining that one of the “principal marketing themes of 
subprime lenders was to encourage consumers with multiple credit card accounts to 
refinance the credit card debt with a mortgage refinance loan”). 
 245. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 246. Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 
1458, 1464 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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lenders, brokers, and investors responsible for these practices from 
engaging in them in the future. 
Bankruptcy courts should develop a federal standard for inequitable 
conduct because of the special favors that creditors receive under 
bankruptcy law.247  State laws vary greatly in their treatment of abusive 
mortgage lending practices,248
Lender behavior that departs from standard lending practices should be 
considered inequitable conduct.
 but full payment on the original loan terms is 
a special benefit granted by bankruptcy law.  Because of this special 
bankruptcy benefit, it is appropriate to hold mortgage lenders to a 
bankruptcy standard of good behavior. 
249  Many subprime loans were made to 
individuals who could not afford them.  The U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development promulgates affordable housing standards that 
compare a household’s income to its monthly housing costs.  A household 
that is paying over 30% of its income toward housing costs is deemed to be 
living in unaffordable housing.250  Making an affordable loan is a normal 
and prudent lending practice, therefore a lender who makes a loan to a 
homebuyer knowing that the loan will make the home unaffordable is a 
lender whose behavior merits punishment.  Many subprime mortgage loans 
resulted in payments that far exceeded the housing cost to income ratio that 
would make a home affordable.251  Lenders who make such loans are not 
relying on the debtor’s ability to repay out of income; they are relying on 
either another bank’s willingness to refinance when the interest rate resets 
or on repayment when the property is sold at a higher price.  This is not a 
normal lending practice, in fact, it looks more like an equity investment in a 
business.252
Loan terms that bear no reasonable relationship to the risk of non-




 247. See supra notes 
  There is 
evidence that borrowers who could qualify for “prime” loans were steered 
to “subprime” loan products.  Many of the borrowers inappropriately 
224–31 and accompanying text. 
 248. A list of state laws governing subprime and predatory mortgage lending can be 
found on the National Conference of State Legislatures’ web site. Mortgage Lending 
Practices, Subprime and Predatory Mortgage Lending, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=12511 (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).  
Vern Countryman, in arguing for equitable subordination or disallowance of the claims of 
improvident lenders, suggested that bankruptcy courts should develop standards for 
unconscionability because the development of the concept of unconscionability in state 
courts was “extremely spotty.” Vern Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy 
Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 407, 430 (1972). 
 249. See supra notes 234–41 and accompanying text. 
 250. For a detailed discussion of these standards, see Eggum, Porter & Twomey, supra 
note 13, at 1135–40. 
 251. See Adams, supra note 49, at 606 (reporting that more than one-half of the subprime 
adjustable rate mortgage loans originated in 2006 had a monthly debt service to income ratio 
of over 40%). 
 252. Mechele Dickerson calls this “asset-based” lending, and classifies it as a type of 
predatory lending because the lenders have the goal of receiving the borrower’s house, not 
receiving timely repayments. Dickerson, supra note 80, at 33. 
 253. See supra notes 224–31 and accompanying text. 
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steered towards higher cost loans were elderly and minority borrowers.254  
In addition, because subprime loans were more profitable for lenders than 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans designed for first-time 
buyers, many lenders steered FHA-eligible buyers to subprime loans.255  
Such steering is an example of behavior that may be legal,256
Under the second prong of the Mobile Steel test, the claimant’s 
misconduct must have resulted in injury to the debtor’s creditors or 
conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant.
 but certainly 
is objectionable.  Steering to reap greater fees is a type of self-dealing.  
Although lenders have no fiduciary duties to their borrowers, loan terms 
that are motivated not by non-payment risk but by the desire to earn higher 
fees should certainly be viewed as inequitable, especially when the 
borrower is a consumer. 
257  Abusive lenders engaged 
in several lending practices that showed little regard for their borrowers’ 
ability to repay their loans. One was the practice of making low and no 
documentation loans.258  Another was the practice of ignoring affordable 
housing standards in making mortgage loans.259  A third was making loans 
with initially high loan to value ratios.260
 
 254. See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 
  These lending practices all led to 
loans with a high risk of default.  When a mortgage lender makes a loan to a 
borrower with little regard for the borrower’s ability to repay, that lender 
injures other creditors because funds that would otherwise go to those 
creditors outside of bankruptcy are diverted to pay an unusually large and 
expensive mortgage loan.  Even prudent creditors may end up with 
borrowers who cannot repay their loans because of job losses and other 
48, at 284 (noting that more than half of the mortgage 
loans obtained by African-Americans and 40% of those obtained by Latinos were subprime); 
Dickerson, supra note 80, at 35 (reporting that “homeowners in high-income black 
neighborhoods are twice as likely as homeowners in low-income white neighborhoods to 
have subprime loans” (emphasis omitted)); Painter, supra note 64, at 89 (arguing that the 
lack of competitive pressure on subprime lenders is “evidenced by the number of borrowers 
with good or excellent credit scores” who purchase their homes using subprime loans); Alan 
M. White, Borrowing While Black:  Applying Fair Lending Laws to Risk-Based Mortgage 
Pricing, 60 S.C. L. REV. 678, 701–02 (2009) (discussing the New York Attorney General’s 
investigation of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., which found that “black and Hispanic 
customers with high credit scores were much more likely to receive subprime products”). 
 255. See White, supra note 49, at 624–25 (explaining the credit scores of FHA and 
subprime homebuyers). 
 256. The Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibit racial 
discrimination in mortgage terms, but direct proof of racial discrimination in loan approval is 
rare. See White, supra note 254, at 705 (arguing that the enforcement of fair lending laws 
“must respond to the more subtle but invidious mechanisms of the new price 
discrimination”).  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act passed 
in 2010 prohibits some of the abusive practices discussed in this article.  For example, it 
gives a borrower a defense to foreclosure when there is a violation of the act’s provisions 
that prohibit steering borrowers to particular mortgage products and making loans without 
regard to the borrower’s ability to repay. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1403–14, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010).  The new legislation will not affect the abusive mortgage loans that are currently 
outstanding. 
 257. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 258. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
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upheavals, but those creditors did nothing to contribute to the risk of non-
payment and should not be punished by the exercise of equitable 
subordination. 
After a borrower becomes unable to pay, the mortgagee should be able to 
rely on the value of the mortgaged home for repayment.  Yet many 
subprime lenders lent money based on inflated appraisals.261  Negligently 
prepared appraisals might cause borrowers to pay too much for property 
and can leave junior lenders seriously undersecured or completely 
unsecured at the time of foreclosure.262  Overappraisal causes similar harms 
in bankruptcy:  junior mortgagees end up with no collateral, and the holders 
of unsecured claims suffer even greater harm when the home mortgage 
lender is entitled to full payment of not the amount that the property would 
bring at a foreclosure sale, but instead the amount that it is owed on the 
loan.  Overappraisal is exactly the type of creditor behavior that should lead 
to equitable subordination of the creditor’s claim, as it is more likely that an 
overappraised house will be subject to a mortgage in excess of the home’s 
value.263
A lender who makes an abusive mortgage loan without regard to a 
homeowner’s ability to pay and without serious attention to the value of the 
mortgaged property clearly improves its bankruptcy position against other 
secured and unsecured creditors of the debtor.  A Chapter 13 debtor cures 
all arrearages and maintains payment on long-term debt during the term of 
the plan.
 
264  Therefore, she will make her original payments, which may 
include a high interest rate on a secured claim in excess of the value of her 
house, plus all overdue amounts, which may include exorbitant fees.  A 
debtor must commit her “disposable income” to the payment of unsecured 
claims under a Chapter 13 plan, and the payments on secured debts are 
deducted from the debtor’s income in calculating disposable income.265
By making loans that depleted borrower wealth rather than enabling 
borrowers to increase their wealth, subprime home mortgage lenders 
harmed other lenders.  First, debtors were required to commit large 
  As 
a result, a loan that carries the hallmarks of an abusive loan—high fees, a 
high interest rate, and a high loan-to-value ratio—depletes the amount of 
money available to the debtor’s other creditors.  All mortgage loans do so, 
but abusive lending practices result in higher payments, and they are more 
likely to result in mortgage liens that exceed the value of the home. 
 
 261. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  There is evidence that lenders pressured 
appraisers to inflate home values. Eggert, supra note 49, at 1287. 
 262. Robin Paul Malloy, Lender Liability for Negligent Real Estate Appraisals, 1984 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 53, 59–60. 
 263. See Miles, supra note 35, at 265–66 (discussing testimony from the early 1990s 
suggesting that most underwater mortgages were the result of overappraisals or were held by 
second mortgagees who lent against property in which the debtor had little equity). 
 264. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2006). 
 265. Id. §§ 707(b)(2), 1325(b)(3).  These Code sections specify that payments on secured 
debt are subtracted from current monthly income for above-median debtors. For other 
debtors, “disposable income” means current monthly income minus “amounts reasonably 
necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor.” Id. § 1325(b)(2). 
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percentages of their income to mortgage payments, reducing their ability to 
pay other creditors.  Second, high fees and interest rates led to defaults, and 
these back payments were added to the loans, depleting the homeowners’ 
already scant equity.266
The third Mobile Steel prong requires that the exercise of equitable 
subordination must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Code.
  In those cases, the lender can be seen as another 
investor in the property, just as a corporate insider who makes a 
questionable loan to a corporation is viewed as an equity investor.  By 
making a loan without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay, the lender 
is draining the future bankruptcy estate of assets that could be used to pay 
other creditors because all appreciation in the value of the home will be 
paid to the mortgage creditor, not the other creditors. 
267
Congress granted home mortgage lenders special priority and has resisted 
removing that special treatment.
  
Initially, reducing the claim of a home mortgage creditor might seem to fly 
in the face of the clear language of the Code.  The result of equitable 
subordination is often to reorder the priorities set forth in the Code, 
however.  If we view the enhanced property right of a mortgage creditor as 
a priority classification, then subordinating the unsecured portion of such 
claim so that it enjoys the same priority as unsecured claims is consistent 
with other exercises of the equitable subordination power. 
268  That fact might lead some to argue that 
a court cannot equitably subordinate the claims of home mortgage creditors.  
But I do not suggest reducing the claims of all home mortgage creditors, 
only those who engaged in inequitable conduct.  Therefore, such an 
exercise would comply with the Supreme Court’s holding in Noland, which 
prohibits the equitable subordination of entire classes of claims on a general 
categorical level.269  Subordinating the claims of abusive home mortgage 
lenders would further the purpose of equitable subordination:  to ensure that 
injustice is not done in the administration of the bankruptcy estate.270
B.  Possible Objections to Using Equitable Subordination To Cram Down 
Home Mortgages 
 
There are several possible objections to using equitable subordination to 
modify home mortgages.  One objection is that no long-term debt can be 
modified and paid outside of a Chapter 13 plan.  Another is that the 
claimants who will be punished are often not the entities who originated the 
abusive loans.  A third objection is that the questionable practices were 
widespread; all lenders in the subprime sector were making questionable 
loans, and therefore, the practices should not be considered inequitable.  A 
final objection is that debtors who borrowed responsibly will get no relief, 
and debtors who were most likely over their heads will.  These arguments 
are discussed below. 
 
 266. Painter, supra note 64, at 94. 
 267. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 268. See supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text. 
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When Congress first proposed allowing mortgage modification, 
proponents of the legislation argued that home mortgages had been unfairly 
singled out for better treatment than other secured debts by Congress in 
1978.  According to that argument, if a debtor can cram down and 
otherwise modify a mortgage on a vacation home or investor property in 
Chapter 13, a debtor should be able to cram down a home mortgage as 
well.271  Others have explained that the ability of a debtor to cram down a 
mortgage on a second home in Chapter 13 is not as broad as it might seem 
because of the Code’s mandate that a Chapter 13 debtor pay the value of an 
allowed secured claim (the stripped down mortgage claim) over the course 
of the three-to-five-year plan.272  While the scant case law favors the latter 
position,273
A major force behind abusive lending was securitization. 
 the reasoning in those cases does not prevent a court from 
modifying a mortgage using equitable subordination.  Whether other long-
term debt can be stripped down or not should be irrelevant to a court’s 
decision to equitably subordinate an abusive mortgage creditor’s claim.  
The point of equitable subordination is to remedy inequities caused by the 
bad behavior of a creditor, not to change the priority of an entire class of 
claims. 
274  As a result, 
the entities asserting mortgage claims in a bankruptcy case are often not the 
entities who engaged in the questionable lending practices.  This issue was 
raised by some of the critics of In re Yellowstone Mountain Club.275  The 
subordinated loan in In re Yellowstone Mountain Club was made by a 
lending syndicate led by Credit Suisse, the party whose behavior the court 
found egregious.  During the litigation, however, no one raised the issue of 
whether only the portion of the loan retained by Credit Suisse should be 
subordinated.276
The question of whether a court can equitably subordinate a claim held 
by someone other than the original wrongdoer is one on which there is little 
case law.  When it was raised in one of the Enron proceedings in the 





 271. Credit Cards and Bankruptcy:  Opportunities for Reform:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 32 (2008) (written testimony of Robert M. Lawless), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-12-04LawlessTestimony.pdf; Adam J. 
Levitin, Back to the Future with Chapter 13:  A Response to Professor Scarberry, 37 PEPP. 
L. REV. 1261, 1267  (2010); Levitin, supra note 
  The Enron court held that § 510(c) could not be applied 
13, at 581. 
 272. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5) (2006); Mark S. Scarberry, A Critique of Congressional 
Proposals to Permit Modification of Home Mortgages in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 37 PEPP. 
L. REV. 635, 717–21 (2010). 
 273. See, e.g., Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that a debtor could not both strip down a mortgage lien and invoke the 
right to cure and maintain under Chapter 13); In re Bulson, 327 B.R. 830, 847 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2005) (holding that a stripped-down mortgage claim must be paid in full during the 
plan period). 
 274. See generally Eggert, supra note 49. 
 275. See, e.g., Brighton & Parrish, supra note 240. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Enron Corp. v. Springfield Assoc. (In re Enron Corp.), 379 B.R. 425, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007). 
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to a transferee of a claim who himself had not acted inequitably “merely 
because that claim was transferred, directly or indirectly, by a bad actor.”278
The court in Enron relied in part on the lack of case law allowing 
equitable subordination against transferees because of transferor conduct.
 
279  
Congress, however, intended that courts continually develop standards for 
equitable subordination.280  Abusive mortgage practices give the courts a 
perfect opportunity to stop these practices by subordinating claims held by 
investors.  In the case of securitized subprime mortgages, there is 
considerable evidence that investors in subprime securities knew that these 
securities were risky.281  Their very risk is what drew investors to securities 
made up of subprime loans—in exchange for that risk, they carried greater 
returns.282
A third objection is that abusive lending practices were so widespread 
that the terms might not be seen as unusual.  Given the universal scorn of 
these practices, and the evidence that subprime loan terms were often driven 
by concerns other than the borrower’s default risk, their ubiquity should not 
prevent equitable subordination.  Tort law provides a useful analogy in this 
regard.  In a 1906 negligence case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
famously stated that “[w]hat usually is done may be evidence of what ought 
to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable 
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.”
  If a subprime mortgage goes into foreclosure, the investors will 
take the loss.  A bankruptcy cramdown will only reflect that loss. 
283  Justice Learned 
Hand complemented this rule in 1932, stating, “in most cases reasonable 
prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a 
whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available 
devices.”284  While in tort law it is said to be rare that an entire industry 
engages in unsafe practices,285
A final possible objection is that borrowers who borrowed within their 
means and whose mortgages became undersecured because of a market 
decline would get no relief under this proposal, while borrowers who 
borrowed more than they could pay would.  In essence, an honest but 
unfortunate debtor saddled with an underwater mortgage would be denied 
 we know that in the past decade, an entire 
sub-industry of lenders followed unsafe practices in making loans to home 
mortgage borrowers.  As a result, the fact that all subprime lenders engaged 
in these practices should not prevent a court from finding that the practices 
were inequitable. 
 
 278. Id. at 440. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 281. Eggert, supra note 49, at 1303. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (citing Wabash Ry. Co. 
v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454 (1883)). 
 284. New Eng. Coal & Coke Co. v. N. Barge Corp. (The T.J. Hooper), 60 F.2d 737, 740 
(2d Cir. 1932). 
 285. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
285, 294 (2008) (observing that “self-incriminating industry practices” like those followed in 
The T.J. Hooper rarely take place today). 
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relief because his lender was honest in the initiation of the loan and 
unfortunate when the market dropped.  That is true because only abusive 
lenders would find their claims stripped down under this proposal.  Abusive 
lenders acted imprudently in extending credit by ignoring affordable 
housing guidelines and making loans with high loan-to-value ratios and 
thus increased the chances that their borrowers would default on their loans.  
Congress chose to give home mortgage lenders favorable treatment, and in 
the absence of lender bad behavior, they should receive that treatment until 
Congress changes the rule. 
On the other hand, not all irresponsible borrowers will get relief.  A 
borrower who obtained a true “liar’s loan” in that he misrepresented his 
income on his loan application would not be able to discharge the 
unsecured portion of his home mortgage debt.286
CONCLUSION 
  Therefore, a court that 
equitably subordinates the unsecured portion of a home mortgage would be 
inquiring into the “honest but unfortunate” nature of both the debtor and his 
creditors. 
In one of the few law review articles that comprehensively addressed 
equitable subordination in bankruptcy, Asa Herzog and Joel Zweibel 
concluded that “where man’s ingenuity creates new situations without 
precise factual precedent, equity has the capacity to adapt itself . . . . 
[e]quity will be found equal to the task, extending old principles, if 
necessary, to accomplish its purpose.”287
Equitable subordination is an excellent tool for combating abusive 
lending practices for several reasons.  First, it can be used in the absence of 
legislative action.  Unlike the various legislative proposals of the past few 
years, equitable subordination is flexible and durable.  Several of the failed 
bills sought to provide relief only to homeowners whose mortgage loans 
were in existence at the time the legislation went into effect.
  Human ingenuity created abusive 
home lending practices, and equity should intervene to ensure that those 
who engaged in such practices are not rewarded. 
288  Such 
measures may have been effective to alleviate the current mortgage crisis, 
but would have done nothing for creative lending practices that may arise in 
the future.289
 
 286. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (2006) (providing that an individual cannot discharge a debt 
obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud” or by a materially false 
written statement respecting the individual’s financial condition on which the creditor 
reasonably relied). 
  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
 287. Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 161, at 113.  It is important to note that in 1972 Vern 
Countryman made a similar suggestion with respect to lenders who made “improvident” 
loans to consumers.  He made this suggestion because such lenders extended credit “on 
volume rather than on diligent credit investigation.” Countryman, supra note 248, at 431. 
 288. See Zinman & Petrovski, supra note 17, at 141–43 (describing the Helping Families 
Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (2009), and the 
Senate bill of the same name, S. 61, 111th Cong. (2009)). 
 289. A similar criticism is being aimed at proposals to submit systemically significant 
financial institutions to FDIC resolution authority. See Too Big to Fail:  The Role for 
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Protection Act, passed in the summer of 2010, aims to curb the practices 
that led to the current crisis,290 but it does nothing to give relief to the 
homeowners already harmed by these practices.  Dodd-Frank is a step in the 
right direction because, in the absence of regulation, it is likely that 
dangerous loan products will reappear on the market,291 but equitable 
subordination allows judges to deal with any abusive practices not 
anticipated by Congress in 2010.  Judges, with their power to equitably 
readjust the bankruptcy distribution to ensure that “injustice or unfairness is 
not done in the administration of [a] bankrupt[cy] estate,”292
 
 should send a 
message to those involved in abusive lending practices that the claims 
arising from those practices will not get favorable treatment in bankruptcy 
because they did not come to court as honest but unfortunate creditors. 
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Commercial & Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13–16 (2009) 
(testimony of Harvey R. Miller, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, NY), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Miller091022.pdf. 
 290. See supra note 256. 
 291. White, supra note 49, at 635. (“There is little reason to believe that another cycle of 
credit expansion, lax underwriting and hunger for yield will not produce a similar set of 
dangerous products . . . .”). 
 292. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 308 (1939). 
